

NON-PUBLIC?: N
ACCESSION #: 9307190142
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 PAGE: 1 OF 04

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000320

TITLE: RB PURGE WITH HP-R-225 AND HP-R-226 INOPERABLE
EVENT DATE: 06/07/93 LER #: 93-003-00 REPORT DATE: 07/02/93

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: DOCKET NO: 05000

OPERATING MODE: N POWER LEVEL: 000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR
SECTION:

OTHER - SPECIAL REPORT

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:

NAME: JOHN S. SCHORK, TMI LICENSING TELEPHONE: (717) 948-8832
ENGINEER

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:
REPORTABLE NPRDS:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT:

On June 7, 1993, the TMI Maintenance foreman observed that the required channel functional test had not been performed on BP-R-226 within the required monthly surveillance interval. Subsequent investigation determined that on June 5, 1993, the TMI-2 Reactor Budding Purge was operated with HP-R-225 and HP-R-226 in an inoperable condition. HP-R-225 was out-of-service for maintenance. HP-R-226 was in an inoperable condition because the required monthly channel functional test had not been performed within the required surveillance interval. Therefore, purge of the Reactor Building on June 5, 1993, violated the control specified in the TMI Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Part II, Section 3.1.2.2.B.1. The root cause of this event was inadequate administrative control on the scheduling and control of a Technical Specification (Tech. Spec.) and ODCM required surveillances at TMI-2. The immediate corrective action in response to this event was the performance of the channel functional test for HP-R-226. The long term

corrective action taken to preclude recurrence of this event was a change in the method by which Tech. Spec. and ODCM required surveillances for TMI-2 are scheduled and controlled.

END OF ABSTRACT

TEXT PAGE 2 OF 4

I. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS BEFORE THE EVENT

The TMI-2 facility was in Mode 3. The Reactor Building Purge had been shutdown since May 29, 1993.

II. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

The TMI ODCM Part II, Section 3.1.2.2.B.1 requires either BP-R-225 or BP-R-226 to be operable during purge of the Reactor Building. HP-R-225 was taken out of service on May 24, 1993 for maintenance. HP-R-226 was determined to be in an inoperable condition when the Reactor Building Purge was performed on June 5, 1993, because the required monthly channel functional test had not been performed within the allowable interval (the specified 31 day surveillance interval plus the allowable 25 % extension).

III. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On June 5, 1993 the TMI-2 Reactor Budding Purge was operated with HP-R-225 or HP-R-226 in an inoperable condition. HP-R-225 was out of service for maintenance. HP-R-226 was in an inoperable condition because the required monthly channel functional test had not been performed since April 24, 1993. The TMI ODCM Part II, Section 3.1.2.2.I requires a channel functional test be performed at least monthly (monthly is defined in Table 1.1 of Part II as at least every 31 days). Section 4.0.3 of Part II permits the extension of a single surveillance interval by 25 % as long as the maximum combined interval for any 4 consecutive tests does not exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval. June 5, 1993 was 40 days after April 24, 1993; therefore, the allowable single surveillance interval of 38.75 days was exceeded. Because BP-R-226 had not undergone the required channel functional test within the specified surveillance interval, it was classified as inoperable on June 5, 1993. Therefore, the Reactor Building purge conducted on June 5, 1993, was in violation of the control specified in 3.1.2.2.B.1. When a control and/or associated Action Requirements of the ODCM cannot be satisfied, the TMI ODCM Part

II, Section 2/3.0.3 requires a special report be submitted to the Commission pursuant to TMI-2 Recovery Technical Specification (Tech. Spec.) Section 6.9.2 within 30 days unless otherwise specified.

TEXT PAGE 3 OF 4

The TMI-2 Maintenance foreman observed on June 7, 1993 that the channel functional test surveillance "green sheet" for HP-R-226 had not been completed. The stated late date on the surveillance sheet was May 31, 1993. The Maintenance foreman notified the Manager, Plant Operations and Maintenance that HP-R-226 had apparently exceeded its required surveillance interval. Subsequent investigation confirmed that HP-R-226 had indeed exceeded the required surveillance interval and that a Reactor Building Purge had been conducted on June 5, 1993 while both HP-R-225 or HP-R-226 were in an inoperable status.

IV. ROOT CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The root cause of this event was an inadequate administrative control of the scheduling and conduct of surveillances required by TMI-2 Tech. Specs. and the ODCM. The system by which Plant Maintenance scheduled required surveillances was based on the transfer of surveillance due dates from the individual surveillance "green sheets" (which are generated on a monthly basis by the TMI GMS system) onto the Maintenance Instrument and Control monthly work schedule. This event apparently occurred because the "green sheet" for the HP-R-226 monthly channel functional test was received by Plant Maintenance and subsequently misplaced or overlooked. The surveillance was not placed on the Maintenance Instrument and Control schedule for the month of May, 1993. The "missed" surveillance to "green sheet" was not noticed until June 7, 1993, after the surveillance late date had past.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate

The immediate corrective action taken in response to this event was the successful performance of the channel functional test for HP-R-226 and return to service on June 7, 1993.

Long-Term

The long term corrective action taken in response to this event was the modification of the method by which Tech. Spec. and ODCM required surveillances are scheduled and tracked. The practice of inputting surveillance schedule dates from the individual

surveillance "green sheets" has been

TEXT PAGE 4 OF 4

discontinued. All surveillance schedule dates will be inputted onto the monthly maintenance schedule from the Master surveillance schedule. This will eliminate the possibility of not having a surveillance scheduled due to a misplaced "green sheet".

VI. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A

VII. AUTOMATIC OR MANUALLY INITIATED SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES

N/A

VIII. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT.

The purge of the Reactor Building with both HP-R-225 or HP-R-226 in an inoperable status has no significant consequences or implications and posed no hazard to the health and safety of the public; the release was filtered by the station ventilation exhaust HEPA filters and monitored by HP-R-219, the station ventilation exhaust monitor. HP-R-219 is located downstream of HP-R-225 and HP-R-226 and is interlocked with the ventilation air exhaust system. A high alarm on HP-R-219 will initiate shutdown the ventilation air exhaust system. The RB purge conducted on June 5, 1993 without HP-R-225 or HP-R-226 did not result in an unmonitored release or a condition which could impact public health or safety. Therefore, there were no significant safety consequences or implications as a result of this event.

IX. EVENTS OF SIMILAR NATURE

LERs 87-10, 89-02, 91-01 and 93-01

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