

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 6/20/90, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FIRE SYSTEM HOSES INSIDE THE TMI-2 REACTOR BUILDING HAD NOT BEEN CONDUCTED WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME PERIOD. THE LATE DATE FOR PERFORMANCE OF THE SURVEILLANCE WAS 6/17/90. THE VISUAL INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED ON 6/21/90, IN RESPONSE TO A FINDING BY THE OPERATIONS STAFF. FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 18 THROUGH JUNE 21 THE FIRE HOSE STATIONS IN THE REACTOR BUILDING WERE NOT OPERABLE AS DEFINED IN THE TMI-2 RECOVERY OPERATIONS PLAN. THE ACTION STATEMENT OF TMI-2 TECH SPEC 3.7.10.4 STATES THAT AN ADDITIONAL HOSE MUST BE ROUTED TO THE UNPROTECTED AREA FROM AN OPERABLE HOSE STATION WITHIN 1 HOUR. THIS ACTION WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED. THEREFORE, THIS EVENT IS CONSIDERED REPORTABLE PER 10 CFR 50.73 (A)(2)(I)(B) DUE TO A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY THE PLANT'S TECH. SPECS. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS PERSONNEL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM STAFF, SHIFT FOREMEN AND CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS, WHO FAILED TO ADEQUATELY TRACK THE STATUS OF THE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE AND FAILED TO PROPERLY INFORM THE INCOMING SHIFT CREW OF THE NEED TO CONDUCT THE SURVEILLANCE. THIS EVENT AS WELL AS THE PROPER METHOD TO TRACK THE STATUS OF PENDING SURVEILLANCES AND EFFECT SHIFT TURNOVER ARE BEING REVIEWED WITH ALL PLANT OPERATIONS SHIFT FOREMEN AND CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS.

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