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	In the form 306 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-83) APPROVED OMB NO. 3160-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) BY WOCT 2 2 1985				
	FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) Three Mile Island Unit 2 0 5 0 0 3 2 0 1 OF 0 2				
Lon	Flood Protection Dike Minor Degradation				
9	EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR YEAR DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
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	OPERATING MODE (s) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURBUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CER §: (Check one or more of the following) (11) 20,402(b) 20,408(c) 80,73(a)(2)(iv) 73,71(b)				
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	LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER TELEPHONE NUMBER				
Z	Christopher J. Dell, TMI-2 Technical Analysist 7,1,7 9,4,8,-,8,2,4,4				
12	COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS HEPORT (13)				
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\sim	SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				
R	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO				
Č,	ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space sypewritten lines) (16)				
	Special Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-001 reported The results of a				
\mathcal{O}	January 3, 1985, survey of Regions 1 and 2 of the TMI Flood Protection Dike				
	305' elevation specified for that region in the TMI-2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).				
	The suggested long term corrective action called for by the Incident Event Report (IER) included a survey to determine the elevation of the remainder of the dike.				
X	A survey was performed by taking elevation readings at twenty foot (20') intervals around the entire length of the dike. The survey gave an accurate profile of the dike in its present state.				
	Results of the survey showed that sections of the dike were below the nominal values stated in the Unit 2 FSAR. As stated in the FSAR the maximum crest elevation of the dike at the north end of the island is 310'. The actual top of the dike elevation at this location is 309.55'.				
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 The FSAR also requires a maximum crest elevation of 304' at the south end of the island. The low area of the south dike is 303.22'. In addition, the FSAR states that the dikes along both sides of the island should descend uniformly from 310' to 305'. However, there are a few areas of the dike where the lowest elevation is below the 305' level; the lowest elevation is 304.70'. TMI-2 does not consider this minor degradation of the dike to be a safety concern. This determination is based on the following: The purpose of the protective dike surrounding the island is to guarantee the continued safe operation of the unit up to design flood conditions. Water elevations at design flood conditions are 304' at the north end of the island and 303' at the intake structure. Both of these levels are below the current maximum elevations of the dike. The TMI-2 Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.6, requires that all door seals and flood panels be installed and that all watertight doors be closed within two (2) hours of the river stage reaching an elevation of 302', as measured at the TMI-1 Intake Structure. The degraded sections of the dike are not below 303.22'. Therefore, the degraded sections of the dike are still well above the action level specified in the TMI-2 Technical Specifications. The TMI-2 FSAR states the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) would overtop the design elevation of the dike. The flood of record, which occurred in 1972, caused a water level of 301.30' at the north end of the island, and 299.37' at the south end. Both levels were well below the current maximum crest elevations of the dike. Based on the above, GPU Nuclear believes that the dike degradation is minor and that no corrective actions are necessary at this time to restore the dike to design elevations. 	TEXT (If more ap	ABSTRACT (Cont'd)		
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4410-85-L-0173 Document ID 0309A

September 12, 1985

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: Dr. T. E. Murley Regional Administrator US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2) Operating License No. DPR-73 Docket No. 50-320 Special Licensee Event Report 85-001 Update

Attached is an update to Special Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-001 which concerned minor degradation in Region 1 of the TMI Flood Protection Dike.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TMI-2 Technical Specification Section 6.9.2 and Recovery Operations Plan Section 4.7.6.1.3.

Sincerely. R. Standerfer

Vice President/Director, TMI-2

FRS/CJD/eml

Attachment

cc: Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. B. J. Snyder Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. W. D. Travers Document Control Desk

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation