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NRC Form 366 (9-83) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85  
**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1) **Three Mile Island, Unit 2** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **0 5 0 0 0 3 2 0 1** PAGE (3) **1 OF 0 4**

TITLE (4) **Improper Valve Lineup of the Reactor Building Purge System** ← Title

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)					
0	2	2	8	4	4	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
0	2	2	8	4	4	0	3	2	6	8	4	0	5	0	0	0

5-18-84

OPERATING MODE (9) **N** THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

Carole

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
<b>Russell D. Wells, TMI-2 Licensing Engineer</b>	<b>7 1 1 7 9 4 8 - 8 4 6 1 1</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1000 hours on February 24, 1984, during the performance of a Quality Assurance Monitoring, the following event was determined to be reportable. Between 0900 and 0930 hours and 1315 and 1430 hours on February 22, 1984, the Reactor Building Purge "A" Train was temporarily shut down. The Control Room Operator who performed the shutdowns utilized the wrong revision of Operating Procedure 2104-4.91. This was due to the operator using a signed-off copy of the procedure instead of a "verified copy" as required by GPUNC procedures. This resulted in the failure to close containment valve AH-V-2A during the times the Purge System was shut down. This placed the unit into a condition not permitted by the Operating Procedure. Containment isolation was maintained since Containment Isolation Valve AH-V-1A, located outside of the Reactor Building downstream of AH-V-2A, was closed. The CRO has been counseled regarding this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8   4	-   0   0   5	-   0   0	0   2	0   0	4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS BEFORE THE EVENT

The TMI-2 facility is in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat is being removed via loss to ambient. At the time of the event, the Reactor Building Purge "A" Train was in operation. Throughout this event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

II. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

N/A

III. EVENT DESCRIPTION

At 1000 hours on February 24, 1984, during the performance of a Quality Assurance (QA) Monitoring, the following events were determined to be reportable.

AT 0900 and 1315 hours on February 22, 1984, temporary shutdowns of the Reactor Building Purge (IEEE Code - BB) "A" Train were performed due to routine maintenance. The Control Room Operator who performed the temporary shutdowns utilized Operating Procedure 2104-4.91, Reactor Building Purge Using the Modified Purge System. However, the CRO, in both cases, used a superceded revision of the procedure instead of the revision which is currently in effect. This occurred in part because the Control Room filing cabinets contain both the current revision of each Operating Procedure and the last signed-off copy of that procedure. The CRO, in both instances, inadvertently removed the signed-off copy, which was a prior revision of the procedure; he then used the signed off copy to perform the temporary shutdown described in Section 3.3.1 of 2104-4.91. This revision required that containment isolation valves AH-V-1A (RB Inlet Purge Line) and AH-V-4A (RB Outlet Purge Line) be closed when performing a temporary shutdown. The CRO closed AH-V-1A and instructed another operator to close AH-V-4A. Additionally, the CRO closed AH-V-3A which is a containment isolation valve located inside the RB upstream of AH-V-4A. However, the current revision of 2104-4.91 requires, in addition to the above valves, that containment isolation valve AH-V-2A (RB Inlet Purge Line) also be closed. Thus, since the CRO failed to close AH-V-2A, the unit was placed into a condition not permitted by the Operating Procedure.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(c). Additionally, with AH-V-2A open, the unit was placed into the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Containment Integrity. However, the criteria of the Action Statement was satisfied since the affected penetration (R-550) was maintained closed with a closed manual valve (AH-V-1A). At 0930 and 1430 hours on February 22, 1984, RB Purge Operations were resumed and the system lineup was returned to normal. Subsequently, the QA evaluator reviewed the used procedure copy and discovered that the incorrect revision was used during the above evolutions.

The root cause of this event was personnel error in that the CRO who performed the temporary shutdowns failed to verify that the procedure he was using was the current revision. The current revision of each GPUNC procedure maintained in the Control Room is stamped "Official Copy". GPUNC Administrative Procedure 4000-ADM-1218.04, TMI-2 Document Control and Distribution, specifically states that whenever a procedure is required for field use, the Official Copy is reproduced, the reproduced document is compared/verified to the Official Copy, and is then stamped to be a "Verified Copy". The "Verified Copy" must be signed and dated by the verifier to indicate that the copy is identical to the Official Copy. Additionally, the Verified Copy must be logged out. In this event, the CRO failed to perform any of the above requirements. Instead, he utilized the last signed off copy of the procedure (which is kept on file with the "Official Copy" for reference) to perform the evaluation.

Please note that the event date of this LER is February 22, 1984; however, the date of discovery was February 24, 1984. Therefore, the due date of this LER is March 26, 1984 (i.e., 30 days from the discovery date of February 24, 1984).

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED

The CRO was counseled regarding the requirements of 4000-ADM-1218.04. Additionally, this event will be reviewed and discussed with all Shift Supervisors and Control Room Operators.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A

VI. AUTOMATIC OR MANUALLY INITIATED SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES

N/A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT

Containment Isolation Valve AH-V-1A, located downstream of AH-V-2A, was closed. This valve is located directly outside of the Reactor Buiding, therefore, any release to the environment through this line would have been precluded.



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March 26, 1984

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Licensee Event Report 84-05

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 84-05 concerning the improper valve lineup during the temporary shutdown of the Reactor Building Purge "A" Train on February 22, 1984.

This event is considered reportable under Section 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(c) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kanga  
Director, TMI-2

BKK/RDW/jep

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator - Office of I & E, Dr. T. E. Murley  
Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. B. J. Snyder  
Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office, Mr. L. H. Barrett

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