

NOV 16 1984

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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B&W

195731

FACILITY NAME (1) Three Mile Island Unit 2						DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 0 1			PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 3		
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TITLE (4) *update on*
Inoperability of ~~both~~ Decay Heat Removal Systems

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
03	20	84	84	004	0	11	01	88	Rev. 0 on file		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Russell D. Wells, TMI-2 Licensing Engineer	7 1 7 9 4 8 1 - 8 2 4 4

0-29-83

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	B	M	L	200	N				

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Since the March 28, 1979, accident, the Decay Heat Removal System Vaults have been inaccessible due to high radiation levels. While dose reduction efforts now permit personnel entry, surveillance testing had been delayed until preventative maintenance on Decay Heat Removal System components was completed. At 1010 hours on March 2, 1984, Decay Heat Removal Pump DH-P-1A was declared inoperable when Technical Specification surveillance testing was not performed.

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications, because the "B" Decay Heat Removal Pump, previously declared inoperable, continues out-of-service for the same reason as the "A" Pump. *During maintenance for pump A, Decay Heat Removal valve DH-V-5A was found to have a grounded motor.*
The "A" Loop was returned to service at 1730 hours on April 27, 1984.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS BEFORE THE EVENT

The TMI-2 facility continues in the Recovery Mode. The unit is in a long-term cold shutdown state with the reactor decay heat being removed via loss to ambient. The Reactor Coolant System was in the partially drained-down level subsequent to underhead investigations.

II. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

On February 18, 1984, Decay Heat Removal System (IEEE Code B0) Pump DH-P-1B was declared inoperable and remains inoperable pending completion of Technical Specification surveillance test operation.

III. EVENT DESCRIPTION

At 1010 hours on March 2, 1984, Decay Heat Removal System Pump DH-P-1A was declared inoperable, thereby entering the unit into the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 which requires, in part, restoration of one Decay Heat Removal Pump to operable status within 72 hours. Since the March 28, 1979, accident, Decay Heat Removal System Vaults located in the Auxiliary Building have been inaccessible due to high radiation levels. For over four years, an ALARA exemption, allowed by the TMI-2 Recovery Operations Plan, had prevented the performance of Technical Specification surveillances and preventative maintenance on the Decay Heat Removal System and components contained therein. While, to date, dose reduction efforts have reduced the radiation levels within the Decay Heat Removal Vaults such that personnel entry is now feasible, it is considered prudent to perform preventative maintenance on the Decay Heat Removal System components prior to their operation. The preventative maintenance activities deemed necessary for pump operation required substantially more than 72 hours to complete; therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

At 1730 hours on April 27, 1984, DH-P-1A was returned to service, thereby removing the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1. Prior to restoring the pump to service, the Decay Heat Removal Loop was flushed and drained, preventive maintenance was performed, and Surveillance Procedure 4303-M2,

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A 3) (1/7)

"Decay Heat Removal Pump Operational Test", was satisfactorily completed. During the pre-operational maintenance of DH-P-1A, DH-V-5A was found to have a grounded motor. This valve has a manual override; therefore, the "A" Loop of the Decay Heat Removal System would be operable if its use was required.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED

Current plans are to remove and replace the motor for Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V-5A. A refurbishment package for the restoration of the "B" Loop of the Decay Heat Removal System is presently being reviewed.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Motor for DH-V-5A - manufactured by Limitorgue Corporation

VI. AUTOMATIC OR MANUALLY INITIATED SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES

N/A

VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT

In TMI-2's present condition, the Decay Heat Removal System is utilized as a make-up flowpath for borated water. Additional systems, such as Mini-Decay Heat Removal and gravity-feed from the Borated Water Storage Tank, are available for boration control. The system is not required for decay heat removal.



GPU Nuclear Corporation

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October 18, 1984

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Updated Licensee Event Report 84-04

Attached is updated Licensee Event Report 84-04 concerning the inoperability of both Decay Heat Removal System Pumps on March 2, 1984.

Sincerely,

F. R. Standerfer
Vice President/Director, TMI-2

FRS/RDW/jep

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator - Office of I & E, Dr. T. E. Murley
Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. B. J. Snyder
Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. W. D. Travers

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