

LER 83-061/03L-0
EVENT DATES - November 10 and 16, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

At 1230 hours on November 10, 1983, the Reactor Building (RB) Sump Level Indicator was observed to be reading high at an indicated level of 31.8" H₂O on RBS-LT-6000. This was based on the fact that the level indication the day before was 4.50" H₂O and no water had been added to the RB Basement since then. The level instrument was declared out-of-service and a work request was submitted to investigate the cause. A calibration of RBS-LT-6000 was performed and found it to be accurate. After a blowdown was performed of the bubbler (sensing) line and the reference line, the level indication returned to normal. The RB Sump Level Indicator was returned to service at 1900 hours on November 10, 1983, within the eight hour Technical Specification timeclock.

At 0300 hours on November 16, 1983, the RB Sump Level Indicator was again observed to be reading high at an indicated level of 52" H₂O as opposed to the expected normal level of 4.5" H₂O. Due to this anomaly, the RB Sump Level Indicator was declared inoperable. After several attempts were made to correct the abnormal indication by adjusting the flow and pressure, an airblow of the bubbler and reference lines was performed and the level indication was returned to normal. The RB Sump Level Indication was returned to service at 0400 hours on November 16, 1983, within the eight hour Tech Spec timeclock.

The above events are considered reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6.

This LER is similar to LER's 82-35 and 83-17 in that it concerns failure of the RB Sump Level Instrumentation.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the abnormal level indication in both events was due to an obstruction in the bubbler and/or reference lines of the level transmitter.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate - In both events, the corrective action to restore the instrumentation to operable status was to airblow the bubbler and reference lines.

Long-Term - In order to prevent obstructions from accumulating in the RB Sump Level system, the bubbler and reference lines will be blown down once a month. This requirement is being added to the monthly Preventive Maintenance Program.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A



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December 8, 1983
4410-83-L-0284

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 83-061/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-061/03L-0 concerning the failure of the Reactor Building Sump Level instrumentation on November 10 and 16, 1983.

This event concerns Section 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kanga
B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

BKK/RDW/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

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