

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1954211 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) *B&W*

01 P A T M I 2 200-00000-000 3411111 4 5  
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On October 10, 1983, a prompt reportable event was determined to exist. Procedure  
03 2104-4.62, "Temporary Nuclear Sampling System", failed to provide double valve  
04 isolation of the RCS during certain sampling modes. Double valve isolation was  
05 required by the Underhead Characterization Safety Evaluation Report as a defense  
06 against RCS deboration. No significant occurrence resulted from this event. This  
07 condition was considered reportable pursuant to Technical Specification Section  
08 6.9.1.8(i)

09 P B 11 D 12 Z 13 V A L V E X 14 X 15 D 16  
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17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 051 01 X 1 1  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The failure to completely incorporate safety evaluation report requirements into the  
11 Sampling Procedure resulted in a defective procedure. The required double valve  
12 isolation was provided by immediately closing Valves SNS-V20 and SNS-V23. Sampling  
13 Procedure 2104-4.62 was revised on December 28, 1983, to include this double valve  
14 isolation.

15 X 28 000 29 Recovery Mode A 31 Operating Procedure review 32  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A 36  
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17 000 37 Z 38 N/A 39  
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18 000 40 N/A 41  
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19 Z 42 N/A 43  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

20 N 44 N/A 45  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

NAME OF PREPARER Russ Wells PHONE (717) 948-8461

*8-1-C-01*

*Rev. 0 on file*

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NRC USE ONLY

LER 83-051/01X-1  
EVENT DATE - October 10, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

On October 5, 1983, during a review of Operating Procedure 2104-4.62, "Temporary Nuclear Sampling System", Operations personnel discovered that certain sampling evolutions failed to provide closed, double isolation valves in potential Reactor Coolant System (RCS) deboration pathways. Additional investigation identified this to be in conflict with statements in the Safety Evaluation Report for Underhead Characterization. On October 10, 1983, this event was determined to be prompt reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(i).

This event is similar to LER 83-42 dated October 3, 1983.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The Operating Procedure deficiency was the proximate cause of this event. Procedure 2104-4.62 failed, in certain sampling evolutions, to require double isolation valve closure as called for in the Recovery Operations Underhead Characterization Safety Evaluation Report.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

- At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core. The Reactor Coolant System was in the drained-down condition for Underhead Characterization.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate: Valves SNS-V20 and SNS-V23 were closed and tagged to provide double isolation.

Long-Term: Procedure 2104-4.62, "Temporary Nuclear Sampling System" was revised on December 28, 1983, to ensure the required double isolation exists in all evolutions.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A



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October 12, 1984

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Updated Licensee Event Reports

The Licensee Event Reports listed in Attachment 1 have been updated and are enclosed as Attachment 2 to this letter.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact Mr. J. J. Byrne of my staff.

Sincerely,

F. R. Standerfer  
Vice President/Director, TMI-2

FRS/RDW/jep

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator - Office of I & E, Dr. T. E. Murley  
Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. B. J. Snyder  
Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office, Mr. L. H. Barrett

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LER UPDATE PACKAGE

82-038/03L-1  
83-007/03X-1  
83-020/03X-1  
83-021/03X-1  
83-022/03X-1  
83-023/01X-1  
83-024/01X-1  
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83-031/03X-1  
83-036/03X-2  
83-040/03X-1  
83-042/01X-1  
83-043/03X-1  
83-044/03X-1  
83-046/03X-1  
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