

Fire watch not performed on unsealed penetration at  
Three Mile Island 2

NOV 11 1983

B & W

NRC FORM 366  
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Attachment 1  
4410-83-L-0220

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK 181441121 (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | P | A | T | M | I | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
01 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On August 19, 1983, at 1000 hours, it was determined that an hourly  
03 | firewatch was not in effect for Penetration Fire Seal 4-065-80 in the  
04 | Auxiliary Building. This seal was nonfunctional pending replacement.  
05 | This condition existed since 1445 hours on August 16, 1983, when the  
06 | firewatch was secured. This is a violation of Technical Specification  
07 | 13.7.11. No significant occurrence resulted from this event.

08 | \_\_\_\_\_

09 | A | B | 11 | A | 12 | B | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LER NO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 3 | 23 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 27 | 0 | 1 | 29 | L | 31 | 0 | 32  
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

18 | H | 19 | H | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | Z | 25 | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 2  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Inaccurate communications between Fire Protection and Quality Control  
11 | inspection personnel led to the erroneous belief that the seal had  
12 | been satisfactorily replaced. At 1000 hours on August 19, 1983, the  
13 | required hourly firewatch was re-established. Receipt of final  
14 | acceptance documentation is now required prior to firewatch termination.

15 | X | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | Recover Mode | 30 | A | 31 | Operator observation | 32  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 35 | N/A | 36  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | 41  
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

19 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43  
7 8 9 10 80

20 | N | 44 | 8310200095 830921  
PDR ADDCK 05000320  
S PDR  
7 8 9 10 80

NAME OF PREPARER Thomas L. Gould PHONE (717) 948-8461

Handwritten initials: JER

Handwritten initials: JER

LER 83-038/01L-0  
EVENT DATE - August 19, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

On August 19, 1983, at 1000 hours, it was determined that an hourly firewatch was not in effect for Penetration Fire Seal 4-065-80 on the 281' elevation of the Auxiliary Building. At that time, the penetration fire barrier was non-functional pending replacement of the seal. This condition existed since 1445 hours on August 16, 1983, when the firewatch was secured in the area of Seal 4-065-80. An hourly roving firewatch was re-established at 1000 hours on August 19, 1983, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.11. No significant occurrence resulted from this event. It is apparent that the roving firewatch in the area of Seal 4-065-80 was terminated on August 16, 1983, based on incorrect information that the seal had been satisfactorily replaced.

This condition is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 and is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(b).

This LER is similar in some aspects to LER's 83-28 and 83-03.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Incomplete and/or inaccurate communications between Fire Protection and Quality Control inspection personnel led to the erroneous belief that Fire Seal 4-065-80 had been satisfactorily replaced by August 16, 1983.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate - A roving firewatch was established at 1000 hours on August 19, 1983, in the area of Seal 4-065-80.

Long-Term - The fire protection engineer has been directed to delay termination of roving firewatches until final quality control acceptance documentation is received. This eliminates reliance on verbal communication.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A

NOV 11 1983

B & W:



**GPU Nuclear Corporation**  
Post Office Box 480  
Route 441 South  
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191  
717 944-7621  
TELEX 84-2386  
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

September 21, 1983  
4410-83-L-0220

Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator  
Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Licensee Event Report 83-038/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-038/01L-0 concerning the failure to maintain required firewatches in the area of breached fire seals on August 19, 1983.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.7.11 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

This LER is being submitted after the thirty (30) day Technical Specification requirement as discussed by Mr. S. D. Chaplin of TMI-2 Licensing and Mr. J. S. Wiebe, Senior Resident Inspector, TMI-2, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September 20, 1983.

Sincerely,

*B. K. Kanga*  
B. K. Kanga  
Director, TMI-2

BKK/TLG/jep  
Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office  
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office  
Mr. J. S. Wiebe, Senior Resident Inspector - TMI Program Office

IER2  
11