On August 19, 1983, at 1000 hours, it was determined that an hourly firewatch was not in effect for Penetration Fire Seal 4-065-80 in the Auxiliary Building. This seal was nonfunctional pending replacement. This condition existed since 1445 hours on August 16, 1983, when the firewatch was secured. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11. No significant occurrence resulted from this event.

Inaccurate communications between Fire Protection and Quality Control inspection personnel led to the erroneous belief that the seal had been satisfactorily replaced. At 1000 hours on August 19, 1983, the required hourly firewatch was re-established. Receipt of final acceptance documentation is now required prior to firewatch termination.
LER 83-038/01L-0
EVENT DATE - August 19, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

On August 19, 1983, at 1000 hours, it was determined that an hourly firewatch was not in effect for Penetration Fire Seal 4-065-80 on the 281' elevation of the Auxiliary Building. At that time, the penetration fire barrier was non-functional pending replacement of the seal. This condition existed since 1445 hours on August 16, 1983, when the firewatch was secured in the area of Seal 4-065-80. An hourly roving firewatch was re-established at 1000 hours on August 19, 1983, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.11. No significant occurrence resulted from this event. It is apparent that the roving firewatch in the area of Seal 4-065-80 was terminated on August 16, 1983, based on incorrect information that the seal had been satisfactorily replaced.

This condition is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 and is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(b).

This LER is similar in some aspects to LER's 83-28 and 83-03.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Incomplete and/or inaccurate communications between Fire Protection and Quality Control inspection personnel led to the erroneous belief that Fire Seal 4-065-80 had been satisfactorily replaced by August 16, 1983.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate - A roving firewatch was established at 1000 hours on August 19, 1983, in the area of Seal 4-065-80.

Long-Term - The fire protection engineer has been directed to delay termination of roving firewatch until final quality control acceptance documentation is received. This eliminates reliance on verbal communication.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A
Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
   Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 83-038/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-038/01L-0 concerning the failure to maintain required firewatches in the area of breached fire seals on August 19, 1983.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.7.11 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

This LER is being submitted after the thirty (30) day Technical Specification requirement as discussed by Mr. S. D. Chaplin of TMI-2 Licensing and Mr. J. S. Wiebe, Senior Resident Inspector, TMI-2, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September 20, 1983.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kang
Director, TMI-2

BKK/TLG/jep
Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
    Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office
    Mr. J. S. Wiebe, Senior Resident Inspector - TMI Program Office

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