**Incore Thermocouple 0-6** began to exhibit erratic behavior; therefore, in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5, Table 3.3-10, Item 10, this report is submitted. LER's 80-13, 80-41, 80-50, 80-53, 81-05, 81-13, 82-15, and 83-10 concern thermocouple failures also. This event had no adverse effects on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the public.

The reason for the failure of Thermocouple 0-6 is not known and may not be possible to determine given the condition of the Unit 2 core relative to incore instrumentation. To date, no adverse trend in the overall incore thermocouple system behavior has become apparent. Therefore, no further action is considered applicable.
I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

Incore Thermocouple 0-6 began to exhibit erratic behavior; therefore, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10, Item 10, this report is being submitted.

To date, nine (9) LER's, including this one, concern thermocouple failures. The others are LER 80-13, 80-41, 80-50, 80-53, 81-05, 81-13, 82-15, and 83-10.

There are now fourteen (14) of the fifty-two (52) incore thermocouples reported as being out-of-service (D-14, E-11, G-5, H-9, H-13, K-12, L-6, L-11, L-13, M-9, N-8, N-9, O-6 and O-12). However, three (3) of these thermocouples (including D-14, M-9, and N-9) presently appear to be functioning properly and are being used to help monitor incore conditions as long as they are functioning correctly.

II. CAUSES OF THE OCCURRENCE

The precise reason for the failure/erratic behavior of Incore Thermocouple 0-6 is not known and may not be possible to determine given the condition of the Unit 2 core relative to incore instrumentation.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Incore Thermocouple 0-6 was checked to ensure that the problem is not in any component that is accessible for repairs.

To date, no adverse trend in the overall incore thermocouple failure rate has become apparent. Therefore, no further action is considered applicable.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

The failed thermocouple was a Type K (Chromium/Alumel) thermocouple, Model No. DAZA-76-7R-1B-1T-1C, supplied by Babcock and Wilcox, manufactured by Bel Fab, Inc.
August 12, 1983
4410-83-L-0176

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Thomas E. Murley
    Regional Administrator
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 83-027/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-027/01L-0 concerning
the failure of Incorc Thermocouple 0-6 on July 13, 1983.

This event is a violation of Section 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10, Item 10
and is reportable under Section 6.9.1.8 of the Interim Recovery
Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

BKK/SDC/dtf

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
    Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

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