**EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES**

On June 9, 1983, while the Bailey 5 Plant Computer was out-of-service for checks, Panel 4 indications for Reactor Coolant System "A" Loop T-hot and T-cold were utilized. At 1300 hours the Control Room Operator observed that the "A" loop T-hot indicated 560°F (approximately 88°F was expected). A check of alternate instrumentation showed 246°F. Therefore, the "A" loop T-hot instrument was declared inoperable. This event concerns Section 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b).

**CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

Investigation determined that between 1215 and 1300 hours on June 9, 1983, the fuse for the "A" loop T-hot instrumentation was removed inadvertently. The mistake was apparently the result of parallel numbering of multiple rows of fuses within Cabinet 149, thereby resulting in the wrong fuse being pulled. The fuse was replaced and the instrument returned to service. Additional corrective action has been completed.

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**CONT**

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**METHOD OF DISCOVERY**

Operator observation

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**LOCATION OF RELEASE**

N/A

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**NAME OF PREPARER**

Russ Wells

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**PHONE**

(717) 948-8461
I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

On June 9, 1983, the Instrument and Controls Department was performing checks on the Bailey 855 plant computer which resulted in the computer being taken out-of-service. This necessitated using Panel 4 indications for the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) "A" loop T-hot and T-cold (hot and cold leg temperatures). At 1300 hours the Control Room Operator (CRO) observed that the "A" loop T-hot indication was higher than expected. Normal T-hot is approximately 88 degrees farenheit, but Panel 4 indicated 560 degrees farenheit which is midscale of the indicator. A reading was then obtained from the cable room patch panel instrument readout. This reading was 246 degrees farenheit. As a result of these readings, the "A" loop T-hot instrument was declared out-of-service. Investigation determined the cause of the erroneous readings, the fault was corrected, and the instruments were returned to service at 1735 hours on June 9, 1983.

This event is considered reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10.

This LER is similar in nature to LER 83-13.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Investigation determined that between 1215 and 1300 hours on June 9, 1983, the fuse for the "A" loop T-hot instrumentation was removed by mistake. This fuse is located in Cabinet No. 149 in the relay room (or cable room). This cabinet had identically numbered fuses on both sides and the technician went to the wrong side. Apparently the lack of discrete in-place identification of the fuses misled the technician.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate: Fuses were replaced and the instrument was returned to service.

Long-Term: Bakelite tags were fabricated for the non-nuclear instrument cabinet fuse panels. These tags will make the fuses more readily identifiable. This was completed on August 12, 1983.
The importance of identifying the proper components was communicated to appropriate personnel during weekly department meetings; completed as of July 21, 1983.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Updated Licensee Event Reports

The Licensee Event Reports listed in Attachment 1 have been updated and are enclosed as Attachment 2 to this letter.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact Mr. J. J. Byrne of my staff.

Sincerely,

R. Standerfer
Vice President/Director, TMI-2

FRS/RDW/jep
Attachments
cc: Regional Administrator - Office of I & E, Dr. T. E. Murley
Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. B. J. Snyder
Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office, Mr. L. H. Barrett
LER UPDATE PACKAGE

82-038/03L-1
83-007/03X-1
83-020/03X-1
83-021/03X-1
83-022/03X-1
83-023/01X-1
83-024/01X-1
83-025/03X-1
83-031/03X-1
83-036/03X-2
83-040/03X-1
83-042/01X-1
83-043/03X-1
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83-055/03X-1