

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

NOV 16 1984

B&W

CONTROL BLOCK: 19158910 (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 PATMI 2 00-000000-00 3 411111 4 5
 7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58 80

CON'T
 01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 05000320 7 061683 8 101284 9
 7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On June 16 and 30, 1983, while performing the 12-month surveillance of Firewall-50
 03 fire barrier seals per Surveillance Procedure 4331-A1, "Fire Barrier Penetration
 04 Fire Seal Inspection", 9 seals were found to be non-functional. This LER is
 05 similar to LER's 80-51, 81-25, and 81-27. This event is considered reportable
 06 pursuant to Section 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the require-
 07 ments of Technical Specification 3.7.11. This event had no effect on the plant,
 08 its operation, or the health and safety of the public.

09 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
 7 8 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The non-functional seals were the result of dehydration cracking in 2 seals, no
 11 conduit seals for 2 seals, open pull boxes for 4 seals, and physical deformation of
 12 1 seal. Firewatches were initiated and performed as required. The defective seals
 13 have been repaired.

14

15 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

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 PDR ADUCK 05000320
 S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER Russ Wells PHONE (717) 948-8461

Rev. 0 on file

LER 83-021/03X-1
EVENT DATE - June 16, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

On June 16 and 30, 1983, during the performance of the twelve month surveillance of Firewall-50 seals per Surveillance Procedure 4331-A1, "Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Inspection", the following penetration seals were found to be non-functional:

<u>Penetration No.</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Defect</u>
1-083-05	305' Turbine Bldg. MCC 2-31B	Cracks
1-084-05	305' Turbine Bldg. MCC 2-31B	Cracks
1-090-05	305' Turbine Bldg. MCC 2-31B	No Conduit Seal
1-091-05	305' Turbine Bldg. MCC 2-31B	No Conduit Seal
1-118-05	305' Turbine Bldg. MCC Room South Wall	Pull Boxes Open
1-119-05	305' Turbine Bldg. MCC Room South Wall	Pull Boxes Open
5-032-05	305' Diesel Generator Bldg. MCC2-21EC West Wall	Pull Boxes Open
5-058A-05	305' Diesel Generator Bldg. MCC2-11EC West Wall	Pull Boxes Open
4-013-80	281' Fuel Handling Building	Deformation of Seal

As a result of the non-functional seals, the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.11 was entered. This is considered reportable pursuant to Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Technical Specifications.

This LER is similar in some aspects to LER's 80-51 81-25, and 81-27.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

As listed above, the first two inoperable seals were a result of dehydration cracks in the Firewall-50 sealing material.

The next six inoperable seals resulted from inadequate controls to ensure fire barrier penetrations are resealed following maintenance and/or construction activities. Two of these lacked an internal conduit seal within 12 inches of the barrier due to the cable being removed and the seal not reinstalled. The other four had open conduit pull box covers which probably resulted from electricians checking for conduit wire loading and failing to reinstall the covers.

The last inoperable seal was a result of a 1/2 inch clearance between a service air pipe and the surrounding fire barrier material. Although the Firewall-50 sealing dehydrates over a period of time resulting in defects, the deformation in the Firewall-50 was not typical of defects experienced to date. The gap can probably be attributed to the pipe compressing the material either by the pipe being pushed or by line vibration.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate: Hourly firewatches were established for each non-functional seal as required by the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.11.

Seals 1-083-05 through 5-058A (the first eight) were returned to a functional status by repairing/sealing with silicone foam or by replacing the pull box covers, as appropriate. This was completed on July 21, 1983. Seal 4-013-80 was repaired on August 25, 1983.

Long-Term: The Maintenance and Construction supervisors were made aware of the importance of verifying that a penetration fire barrier is functional following any repair or maintenance. They were instructed on what constitutes the breaching of a penetration fire barrier (e.g., open conduit or pipe within twelve inches of barrier face). This was completed on February 22, 1984, via a Plant Engineering memorandum.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Fire barrier penetration sealant Firewall-50; manufactured by Western Chemical Corporation and installed by Chemtrol Corporation.



GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 480
Route 441 South
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191
717 944-7621
TELEX 84-2386
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

(717) 948-8461

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October 12, 1984

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Updated Licensee Event Reports

The Licensee Event Reports listed in Attachment 1 have been updated and are enclosed as Attachment 2 to this letter.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact Mr. J. J. Byrne of my staff.

Sincerely,

F. R. Standerfer
Vice President/Director, TMI-2

FRS/RDW/jep

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator - Office of I & E, Dr. T. E. Murley
Program Director - TMI Program Office, Dr. B. J. Snyder
Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office, Mr. L. H. Barrett

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LER UPDATE PACKAGE

82-038/03L-1
83-007/03X-1
83-020/03X-1
83-021/03X-1
83-022/03X-1
83-023/01X-1
83-024/01X-1
83-025/03X-1
83-031/03X-1
83-036/03X-2
83-040/03X-1
83-042/01X-1
83-043/03X-1
83-044/03X-1
83-046/03X-1
83-050/01X-1
83-051/03X-1
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