

Update on personnel air lock DEC 16 1983 Leaks

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NRC FORM 365 (7-77)

UPDATE REPORT - Previous Report March 17, 1983

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment 1
4410-83-L-0243

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

B & W

CONTROL BLOCK 127420 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | P | A | T | M | I | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 57 58

CON'T
01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 | On February 16, 1983, subsequent to a Reactor Building entry, the doors of the
03 | Personnel Airlock (PAL) No. 2 were leak tested. The inner door failed and was
04 | declared inoperable at 2030 hours. After corrective action, as described below, the
05 | inner door was returned to an operable status at 2245 hours on same date. This event
06 | is a violation of Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 and is reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b). This
07 | event had no effect on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the
08 | public.

09 | S | A | 11 | A | 12 | X | 13 | P | E | N | E | T | R | 14 | A | 15 | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LER NO REPORT NUMBER | 83 | 21 | 22 | 006 | 24 | 26 | 03 | 28 | 29 | X | 30 | 1 | 32 | 31
18 | ACTION TAKEN | C | 18 | F | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0000 | 37 | 40 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | A | 25 | X999 | 44 | 47 | 26
19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20
20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21
21 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 006 | 24 | 26
22 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 03 | 28 | 29
23 | REPORT TYPE | X | 30
24 | REVISION NO | 1 | 32
25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | X999 | 44 | 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 | The cause of the event is attributed to a small gouge in one of the O-Rings of
11 | Reactor Building PAL No. 2 inner door. The damaged O-Ring was replaced, the leakage
12 | rate retested, and found satisfactory. Protective shields for the door seals have
13 | been constructed.
14 |

15 | X | 28 | 000 | 29 | Recovery Mode | B | 31 | Surveillance inspection | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 44 | N/A | 45 | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | 000 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

18 | 000 | 40 | N/A | 41
7 8 9 11 12 80

19 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43
7 8 9 10 80

20 | N | 44 | N/A | 45
7 8 9 10 80

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PDR AD0CK 05000320
S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER Russ Wells PHONE (717) 948-8461

28.8.84
RWP

Rev. 0
on file

LER 83-006/03X-1
EVENT DATE - February 16, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

On Wednesday, February 16, 1983, following a Reactor Building Entry, the Personnel Airlock (PAL) No. 2 inner door was leak tested per Surveillance Procedure 4311-5. The leakage rate exceeded the Technical Specification limit; therefore, at 2030 hours the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 was entered. This event is reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b).

Inspection of the Reactor Building Personnel Airlock No. 2 inner door seals revealed a quarter inch (1/4") gouge in one of the inner door's O-Rings/seals at the six o'clock position.

The damaged seal was replaced, the leakage rate was remeasured with satisfactory results, and the door was returned to an operable status at 2245 hours on February 16, 1983.

This event is similar in nature to LER's 80-10/01L-0, 80-30/01L-0, 80-37/01L-0, 80-44/01L-0, 80-47/01L-0, 80-52/01L-0, and 82-25/03L-0 pertaining to excessive seal leakage for both PAL's of the TMI-2 facility.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The gouge in the inner door O-Ring of Reactor Building PAL No. 2 apparently was caused by an inadvertent impact while moving material into/out of the Reactor Building.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate - The damaged seal was replaced. The leakage rate test was then performed with satisfactory results.

Long-Term - GPUNC has constructed protective shields for the PAL door seals. These protective shields are maintained at the anterooms of both airlocks and are installed at the direction of the entry supervisor. Additionally, CPUNC Operating Procedure 2104-4.55, Revision 8, dated October 13, 1983, has been revised to reflect the use of these protective shields.

All personnel in training for Reactor Building entries are cautioned to avoid damaging the door seals or sealing surfaces when moving material into/out of the Reactor Building. Airlock attendants have been instructed in the same regard.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Two (2) O-Rings (Silicone Cord, 3/8" Cross Section, AMS 3302, 50 Durometer).
Manufactured by the Ja-Bar Silicone Corporation, Andover, NJ.



GPU Nuclear Corporation
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Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191
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TELEX 84-2386
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

October 31, 1983
4410-83-L-0243

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Updated Licensee Event Reports

The Licensee Event Reports listed in Attachment 1 have been updated and are enclosed as Attachment 2 to this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. J. Byrne of my staff.

Sincerely,



B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

BKK/JJB/RDW/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

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LIST OF UPDATED LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

- 80-27 Closing of Deluge Isolation Valves FS-V-4-22B, 4-23B, and 4-24B.
- 80-39 Halon bottles below weight.
- 81-11 Inoperability of Nuclear Service River Water Pump "A".
- 81-24 Excessive Reactor Coolant System leakage.
- 81-30 Improper administrative controls for containment penetration isolation valves.
- 81-37 Nuclear Service River Water Pump NR-P-1B inoperability.
- 82-01 Inoperability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.
- 82-23 Actuation of the AIT Halon System.
- 82-41 Inoperability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.
- 83-01 Inoperability of "A" OTSG pressure indicators.
- 83-04 Failure of the AIT Deluge System.
- 83-06 Leak Testing of the Reactor Building Personnel Airlock No. 2.
- 83-14 Actuation of the Air Intake Tunnel Halon System.