

APR 26 1983



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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

March 16, 1983  
4410-83-L-0055

Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director  
Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Licensee Event Report 83-005/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-005/03L-0  
concerning the inoperability of the Air Intake Tunnel  
Chlorine Monitor on February 14, 1983.

This event concerns Section 3.3.3.7 and is considered  
reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim  
Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

  
B. K. Kanga  
Director, TMI-2

BKK/RDW/jep

Attachment

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office  
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

8304010448 830316  
PDR ADOCK 05000320  
S PDR

LER 83-005/03L-0  
Event Date: February 14, 1983

## I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1305 hours on February 14, 1983, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure 4303-M10 (Chlorine Detector System), it was discovered that the discharge flow from the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) Chlorine Monitor was restricted due to blockage in the discharge piping. This prevented flow through the monitor and, therefore, resulted in the Chlorine Monitor being declared inoperable. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

The Chlorine Monitor was repaired and returned to service on February 15, 1983.

This event is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the requirements of the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

## II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the blockage in the discharge piping was contributed to the fact the pipe discharges at the floor of the Air Intake Tunnel which was covered with frozen water. The presence of water in the Air Intake Tunnel was due, in part, to damaged fire system deluge pipes (Reference LER 83-04).

## III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

## IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

### Immediate

The AIT Chlorine Monitor was placed in the "actuation" mode. This placed the monitor in a "fail safe" mode such that the Chlorine Monitor Detection System would still meet the Technical Specification intention (i.e. the Control Room ventilation would automatically switch to recirc mode upon receipt of trip signal from the Control Room Chlorine Monitor).

The discharge pipe was disconnected at a coupling joint which was at an elevation above the frozen water (approximately 2 feet of pipe removed). The Surveillance Procedure 4303-M10 was satisfactorily completed, the monitor was taken out of the "actuation" mode, and the monitor declared operable.

### Long-Term

The discharge pipe will be left at the 2 feet shortened length.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Chlorine Monitor Meter Relay Assembly Model No. 158A167403,  
manufactured by Fisher Porter, Warminster, Pennsylvania.

Chlorine Monitor Freezes UP

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 183052 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 PLATMI 2 00-000000-000 41111 4 5

01 REPORT SOURCE L 6105000320 021483 8031683 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 1305 hours on February 14, 1983, during the performance of surveillance and
03 testing, the Air Intake Tunnel Chlorine Monitor was declared inoperable
04 due to restricted flow caused by blockage in the discharge piping. This
05 event is considered reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to
06 entry into and compliance with the Action Statement of Tech Spec 3.3.3.7.
07 This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

08

09 IE X Z INSTRU X Z

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 005 03 I 0
ACTION TAKEN X 18 F 19 Z 20 Z 21 0000 22 Y 23 N 24 A 25 F120 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause of the blockage in the discharge piping was due to frozen
11 water on the floor of the AIT. The presence of water was partly a
12 result of damaged fire system deluge pipe fittings. The discharge pipe
13 was shortened by approximately two (2) feet to clear the obstruction and
14 the Chlorine Monitor returned to status on February 15, 1983.

15 X 28 000 29 Recovery Mode B 31 Surveillance Testing 32

16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 N/A 36

17 000 37 Z 38 N/A 39

18 000 40 N/A 41

19 Z 42 N/A 43

20 N 44 8304010432 830315 448 PDR ADDCK 05000320 PDR NRC USE ONLY

Russ Wells

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7-26-83

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