March 16, 1983
4410-83-L-0055

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 83-005/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-005/03L-0 concerning the inoperability of the Air Intake Tunnel Chlorine Monitor on February 14, 1983.

This event concerns Section 3.3.3.7 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
    Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1305 hours on February 14, 1983, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure 4303-M10 (Chlorine Detector System), it was discovered that the discharge flow from the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) Chlorine Monitor was restricted due to blockage in the discharge piping. This prevented flow through the monitor and, therefore, resulted in the Chlorine Monitor being declared inoperable. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

The Chlorine Monitor was repaired and returned to service on February 15, 1983.

This event is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the requirements of the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the blockage in the discharge piping was contributed to the fact the pipe discharges at the floor of the Air Intake Tunnel which was covered with frozen water. The presence of water in the Air Intake Tunnel was due, in part, to damaged fire system deluge pipes (Reference LER 83-04).

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The AIT Chlorine Monitor was placed in the "actuation" mode. This placed the monitor in a "fail safe" mode such that the Chlorine Monitor Detection System would still meet the Technical Specification intention (i.e. the Control Room ventilation would automatically switch to recirc mode upon receipt of trip signal from the Control Room Chlorine Monitor).

The discharge pipe was disconnected at a coupling joint which was at an elevation above the frozen water (approximately 2 feet of pipe removed). The Surveillance Procedure 4303-M10 was satisfactorily completed, the monitor was taken out of the "actuation" mode, and the monitor declared operable.

Long-Term

The discharge pipe will be left at the 2 feet shortened length.
V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

At 1305 hours on February 14, 1983, during the performance of surveillance testing, the Air Intake Tunnel Chlorine Monitor was declared inoperable due to restricted flow caused by blockage in the discharge piping. This event is considered reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the Action Statement of Tech Spec 3.3.3.7.

This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

The cause of the blockage in the discharge piping was due to frozen water on the floor of the AIT. The presence of water was partly a result of damaged fire system deluge pipe fittings. The discharge pipe was shortened by approximately two (2) feet to clear the obstruction and the Chlorine Monitor returned to status on February 15, 1983.