Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 83-02/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-02/01L-0 concerning the inoperability of the "B" Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level instrumentation on January 14, 1983.

This event concerns Section 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

BKK/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office
I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1100 hours on January 14, 1983, while obtaining the "B" Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level from Heise gauge GR-PI-1, as required per Operating Procedure 2104-4.143, Revision 0, it was observed that GR-PI-1 had fallen from its mounting. The integrity of the plastic tubing connecting GR-PI-1 to the valve GR-V-28 was not compromised. The level indication for the "B" OTSG was declared inoperable at this time. The "B" OTSG level indication was remounted, recalibrated, and returned to service at 1410 hours on January 14, 1983.

This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification (Tech Spec) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10. The event is reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.8(b) due to entry into the action statement of Tech Spec LCO 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10.

This LER has aspects similar to LEK's 81-33, 82-34, 82-37, and 82-41.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The event was caused by Heise gauge GR-PI-1 falling from its mounting and receiving a mechanical shock. This shock required that the gauge's calibration be checked. The Heise gauge had been secured to an angle iron with small tie wraps. This angle iron supported piping associated with the pump GR-P-1. Vibration generated by GR-P-1 caused the tie wraps to fatigue and ultimately fail, thus resulting in the subject condition.

Heise gauge GR-PI-1 was installed in the beginning of January, 1983, specifically to provide level instrumentation capability during the cleanup evolution of the OTSG. The level instrument it replaced could not provide needed indication above the mainsteam lines.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The ongoing "B" OTSG recirculation evolutions were secured. The gauge was recalibrated and remounted using heavy duty tie wraps. The gauge was remounted on a pipe not associated with pump GR-P-1, thereby isolating it from the vibration.
Long-Term

As stated in LER 82-37/01L-0, dated December 15, 1982, GFUNC is presently installing a new OTSG level indicator for use on the "A" OTSG which will supply a more accurate level indication based on the static head of water in the OTSG. It is not possible to duplicate this installation on the "B" OTSG because of an inoperative valve located in an inaccessible area of the TMI-2 Reactor Building; however, an alternate arrangement will be installed in the near future. It is GFUNC's intention to have these indicators available by early March, 1983, in order to supply a better indication of OTSG water level to support reactor vessel head removal.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A
At 1100 hours on January 14, 1983, while obtaining the 'B' Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level from Heise gauge GR-PI-1, as required per Operating Procedure 2104-4.143, Revision 0, it was observed that GR-PI-1 has fallen from its mounting. This event placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable pursuant to Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Recovery Technical Specifications. This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

The event was caused by GR-PI-1 falling from its mount due to the vibration induced by failure of the tie wraps which secured GR-PI-1. GR-PI-1 was recalibrated and remounted with heavy duty tie wraps. It was also remounted in a location remote from the vibration source.