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**GPU Nuclear Corporation**  
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

December 15, 1982  
4410-82-L-0075

Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director  
Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Licensee Event Report 82-037/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 82-037/01L-0 concerning the inoperability of the "B" Once Through Steam Generator level instrument on November 15, 1982.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

  
B. K. Kanga  
Director, TMI-2

BKK/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office  
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT  
NARRATIVE REPORT  
TMI-II  
LER 82-037701L-0  
EVENT DATE - November 15, 1982

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1345 hours on November 15, 1982, the Unit 2 "B" Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level indication failed low. This condition resulted in the level indication being declared inoperable. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10.

The "B" OTSG level indication was returned to service at 1537 hours on November 15, 1982. This event is reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.8(b).

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the event could not be accurately and unquestionably determined. Several possible causes are:

1. a loose power supply fuse
2. a loose power supply wall plug
3. a transient electrical phenomena associated with the power supply

For a description of the investigation, please reference the Immediate Corrective Action Section.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The immediate action was to request I&C Maintenance to investigate and repair. An I&C Technician was dispatched to investigate. Upon arriving at the "B" OTSG level indication power supply, the Technician took a potential (voltage) reading across the leads. A zero potential reading was obtained. The power supply was then deenergized. A visual check was made of the power supply fuse and outlet cord. The fuse was verified as satisfactory and the plug was replaced in the outlet to ensure a good "contact". The power supply breaker was checked. The "B" and "A" OTSG indication are powered off the same breaker, thus ruling out a breaker problem. A caution tag was placed on this breaker to preclude inadvertent tripping of the breaker. The Tech then reenergized the "B" OTSG level indication power supply and remeasured the potential across its leads. This time (+) positive voltage was obtained. The rest of the level indication instrumentation was verified as operable. The Tech did report that the power supply seemed to be a bit overheated.

## Long-Term

GPU is presently developing a new OTSG level indicator for use on the "A" OTSG which will supply a more accurate level indication based on the static head of water in the OTSG. It is not possible to duplicate this installation on the "B" OTSG because of an inoperative valve located in an inaccessible area of the TMI-2 Reactor Building, however, an engineering evaluation is underway to supply a similar indication. It is GPU's intention to have these indicators available by early March 1983 in order to supply a better indication of OTSG water level to support reactor vessel head removal.

## V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A