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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

December 10, 1982
4410-82-L-0068

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 82-035/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 82-035/01L-0 concerning the inoperable Reactor Building Sump Level Indicator on November 10, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,


B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

BKK/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-II
LER 82-035/01L-0
EVENT DATE - November 10, 1982

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1120 hours on November 10, 1982, the Reactor Building (RB) Sump Level Indicator was observed to be reading high at an indicated twenty-four (24) inches H₂O on RBS-LTI-6000. (At the time, it was expected that there should have had only three (3) to five (5) inches of water). An investigation was initiated to determine the cause of the high reading and correct the situation.

Due to this anomaly, the RB Sump Level Indicator was declared inoperable. This condition placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6. At 1920 hours on November 10, 1982, the eight (8) hour time clock of the Tech Spec Action Statement was exceeded, thus warranting a prompt report pursuant to Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Recovery Technical Specifications.

The RB Sump Level Indication was returned to service at 1900 hours on November 12, 1982.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this event has been attributed to a buildup of sludge in the end of the RB Sump level's tygon tubing. The level instrument is of the bubbler type with its sensing line (tygon tubing) located on the RB basement floor. The buildup of sludge in the tube is attributed to the recently performed RB decon spraying evolutions in the vicinity of the level indicator's tygon tubing.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

On November 10, 1982, the cause was believed to be a plugged line and confirmatory actions initiated. These actions included:

- The bubbler pressure was raised to 10 lbs. in an attempt to blow the tubing clear. However, no change in indication was observed (November 10, 1982).
- The bubbler instrumentation was checked by setting up a test rig which duplicated the bubbler tube arrangement in a controlled, known set of conditions (November 10, 1982).

- On November 11, 1982, another attempt to blow the line free was made with 20 lbs. of pressure. This time the level indication reduced from approximately 7 inches to .5 inches H₂O.
- On November 12, 1982, the level instrument was returned to service after a preliminary water balance calculation, a visual inspection during an RB entry, and careful tracking of the inleakage and out-leakage for the RB verified the level indication was appropriate and operable. The preliminary water balance calculation was verified by a more detailed calculation performed on November 13, 1982.

In addition, samples were taken from the groundwater monitoring stations on November 13, 1982, to determine if any significant changes had occurred which would indicate a Reactor Building leak. These samples and samples taken subsequent to November 13, 1982, have shown no abnormal changes in groundwater tritium activity.

Long-Term

GPU is evaluating the situation to determine if another type of level instrument would be more appropriate or if any further corrective action regarding the bubbler is necessary.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A