JUL 22 1982

GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

June 30, 1982
4400-82-L-0107

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 82-018/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 82-018/03L-0 concerning 1) ventilation trip in the Auxiliary Building and the Fuel Handling Building, and 2) inoperability of the Air Intake Tunnel Halon System on June 1, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.9.12 and 3.7.10.3 respectively, and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

J. J. Barton
Acting Director, TMI-2

JJB/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director
B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office
V. Stello, Deputy Executive Director

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Attachment 1
4400-81-L-0107

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 — LICENSEE CODE: P A T M I 2 (2) — LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) — LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) — CAT (5)

CON'T 01 — REPORT SOURCE: L (6) — DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 0 (7) — EVENT DATE: 0 6 0 1 8 2 (8) — REPORT DATE: 0 6 3 0 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 1640 hours on June 1, 1982, the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) Halon System actuated. This
03 triggered the actuation of the AIT Deluge System and tripped the Auxiliary and Fuel
04 Handling Buildings (AB & FHB) supply and exhaust fans. This event is considered
05 reportable per Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the action
06 statements of Tech Spec 3.9.12 and 3.7.10.3 as a result of low ventilation flowrate
07 and inoperability (due to discharge) of the Halon System, respectively. This event
08 had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

09 — SYSTEM CODE: A B (11) — CAUSE CODE: C (12) — CAUSE SUBCODE: Z (13) — COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U (14) — COMP. SUBCODE: E (15) — VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER — EVENT YEAR: 8 2 — — — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 1 8 — / — OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 — REPORT TYPE: L — — — REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: X (18) — FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) — EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) — SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) — HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 — ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) — NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) — PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) — COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: F 0 8 1 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The initiating cause of the event is attributed to lightning setting off an ultraviolet
11 light detector in the Air Intake Tunnel. System interlocks operated as designed in
12 performing the subsequent system actuations/trips. The Halon & Deluge Systems were
13 secured and the ventilation systems restored by 1745 hours. The Halon System was
14 recharged and returned to service at 1750 hours on June 12, 1982.

15 — FACILITY STATUS: X (28) — % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) — OTHER STATUS (30): Recovery mode — METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) — DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Operator observation

16 — ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) — CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) — AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): N/A — LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): N/A

17 — PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) — TYPE: Z (38) — DESCRIPTION (39): N/A

18 — PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) — DESCRIPTION (41): N/A

19 — LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE: Z (42) — DESCRIPTION: N/A

20 — PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) — DESCRIPTION

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PDR ADOCK 05000320
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Steven D. Chaplin — PHONE: (717) 948-8461

GPO 917-926

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-II
LER 82-018/03L-0
EVENT DATE - June 1, 1982

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1640 hours on June 1, 1982, the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) Halon System actuated. This triggered the actuation of the AIT Deluge System which in turn tripped the supply and exhaust fans in the Auxiliary (Aux.) and Fuel Handling Buildings (FHB). The tripping of the fans resulted in ventilation flowrates below the Tech Spec minimum allowable exhaust flowrates in both buildings. This placed the unit in the action statement of Tech Spec 3.9.12. The ventilation in both the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings was restored to the Tech Spec operating band at 1745 hours on June 1, 1982.

Halon System actuation results in full discharge of the actuated banks. The actuation on June 1, 1982, rendered the AIT Halon System out-of-service, since it was discharged and therefore non-functional, and thus resulted in placing the unit into the action statement of Tech Spec 3.7.10.3.

These events are considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to inadvertent entry into and compliance with the action statements of the above Tech Specs.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the AIT Halon System actuation has been determined to be a result of the unique adverse weather conditions existing at that time. It is believed that a large atmospheric electrical discharge (lightning) caused the ultra violet detectors/actuators to "trip". This in turn caused the Halon System to actuate, the AIT Deluge system actuation, and the ventilation fan trips due to system interlocks (see Unit 2 Operating Procedure 2104-6.1).

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The AIT Halon System was secured, along with the Deluge System.

The Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation fans were also restarted, and flowrates returned to Technical Specification limits.

The AIT Halon was recharged and then returned to service at 1750 hours on June 12, 1982.

Long-Term

No further action is considered necessary at this time.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A