

Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
P.O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
717-944-7621
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

June 18, 1982
4400-82-L-0104

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 82-016/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 82-016/03L-0 concerning the inoperable deluge sprinkler heads in the H₂ Purge and the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filter Cabinets on May 19, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.7.10.2 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,


J. J. Barton
Acting Director, TMI-2

JJB/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director, TMI Program Office
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director, TMI Program Office
V. Stello, Deputy Executive Director

8207020237 820618
PDR ADOCK 05000320
S PDR

GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utilities System

IE 22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-II
LER 82-016/03L-0
EVENT DATE - May 19, 1982

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1100 hours on May 19, 1982, while performing surveillance procedure 4333-3Y1 (Fire System Deluge/Sprinkler System Flow Test), it was determined that the three (3) H₂ Purge Exhaust Filter Cabinet (AH-F-34) deluge sprinkler heads and eighteen (18) of the ninety (90) deluge sprinkler heads in the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filter Cabinet (AH-F-10B) were inoperable.

This condition placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 and is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b).

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The deluge heads were declared inoperable as a result of reduced or no flow conditions observed during compressed gas flow testing. Investigation has shown that the loss of flow in the H₂ Purge Exhaust Filter Cabinet was the result of installation of a blank flange in the supply line, upstream of the deluge heads. It has not been determined when the blank flange was installed. However, it should be noted that the deluge system is installed for the protection of the charcoal adsorber bank in the H₂ Purge Exhaust Filter Cabinet. The charcoal adsorbers were removed from the Filter Cabinet in September, 1980. Therefore, the inoperability of the three (3) deluge heads has been of no safety significance since that time.

Investigation has shown the loss of or low flow conditions in the 18 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filter Cabinet deluge heads was the result of very fine sediment and/or debris blocking the nozzles.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

The deluge sprinklers were checked and cleaned as necessary. In addition, the blind flange in the supply line to AH-F-34 was removed. At 0935 hours on May 28, 1982, the deluge sprinkler heads in both AH-F-34 and AH-F-10B were declared operable.

The sediment found in the AH-F-10B sprinkler heads has been sent for analysis in order to determine its origin.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A