

**GPU Nuclear** 

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TEN

May 14, 1982 4400-82-L-0076

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director Region I US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2) Operating License No. DPR-73 Docket No. 50-320 Licensee Event Report 82-012/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 82-012/03L-0 concerning the low Fuel Handling Ventilation exhaust flowrate on April 16, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.9.12 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

m. L. Castor for

J. J. Barton Acting Director, TMI-2

JJB/SDC/jep

Attachments

- CC: L. N. Barrett, Deputy Program Director B. J. Snyder, Program Director
  - V. Stello, Deputy Executive Director



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) Attachment 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 4400-82-L-0076 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 10 CONTROL BLOCK: 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 23 28 LICENSE 14 A T M I 2 20 0 -(5) 0 1 LICENSE TYPE 10 LICENSEE CODE CON'T REPORT 2 (9) 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 4 1 8 2 8 0 5 1 L 6 0 5 0 1 SOURCE EVENT OATE 61 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) At 1026 hours on April 16, 1982, the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Exhaust Flowrate 07 was discovered at 32,000 cfm, below the Tech Spec (TS) referenced exhaust flowrate 03 of \$36,000 cfm. Flow recorders indicated that the low flow condition existed since 101 0935 hours on April 16, 1982. This event is considered reportable per TS 6.9.1.9(b) 05 due to entry into and compliance with the action statement of TS 3.9.12. 0 6 This event 07 had no effect on the health and safety of the public. 08 a SYSTEM CODE COMP. CAUSE CAUSE VALVE COMPONENT CODE CODE (14 (12) 7 (13) (16) 0 9 M D (15 2 13 REVISION SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT EVENT YEAR REPORT NO CODE NO. LER RO (17 8 2 1 REPORT 0 1 2 0 13 0 NUMBER 32 -EFFECT ACTION SHUTDOWN NPRD-4 FORM SUB COMPONENT FUTURE SUPPLIER (22) METHOO HOURS SUBMITTED MANUFACTURER 2 (21) 010 J N 0 (18) X (19 7. (20 1 1 23 24 W 1 2 0 A (25 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) No apparent cause has been identified to date. An investigation of this event 10 1 1 still underway. Immediate corrective action was to restart the tripped exhaust and supply fans to restore the required flowrate. Long-term corrective action is 12 undefined pending completion of the investigation. 1 3 14 ā 80 FACILITY METHOODF OTHERSTATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) > POWER (2B) 0 0 0 (29) Recovery mode A (31) 1 5 Operator Observation ACTIVITY CONTENT 17 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36 RELEASED OF RELEASE 2 3 2 34 1 6 N/A PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 80 DESCRIPTION (39 NUNBER TYPE 0 0 0 0 37 2 38 N/A 7 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80 DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 (40) 3 8 0 N/A 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY OESCRIPTION N/A (42 9 10 PUBLICITY 8205250056 820514 PDR ADDCK 05000320 NAC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45 (44 0 PDR 10 68 69 PHONE: (717) 948-8461 Steven D. Chaplin NAME OF PREPARER

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE REPORT TMI-II LER 82-012/03L-0 EVENT DATE - APRIL 16, 1982

## **I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE**

At 1026 hours on April 16, 1982, the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) exhaust flowrate was discovered to be approximately 32,000 cfm, which is below the Technical Specification exhaust flowrate of > 36,000 cfm. A post-event review of the FHB exhaust flowrate recorder indicated that the low exhaust flowrate had existed from 0935 hours on April 16, 1982. During the time period in which the exhaust flowrate was below Technical Sepcification limits there were no radiological liquid or gas movements in the FHB. This event is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to inadvertent entry into the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.12.

#### **II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE**

Upon investigation, it was discovered that the FHB exhaust fan AH-E-10D had tripped. It is believed that the tripping of AH-E-10D resulted in the generation of a low exhaust flowrate signal and this, in turn, resulted in a trip of the FHB supply fans, AH-E-9A/9B. At no time during this event was an alarm received in the Control Room indicating an exhaust or supply fan trip.

### **III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE**

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss of ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

## IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

#### Immediate

The FNB ventilation fans were immediately restarted and the exhaust flowrate returned to within Technical Specification limits.

# Long-Term

No apparent cause could be identified for the Fuel Handling Building exhaust fan (AH-E-10D) trip. An investigation of this event is underway to determine why the exhaust fan AH-E-10D tripped and why the operator was not alerted to the fan trip by the installed instrumentation and alarms.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA