

Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

May 14, 1982
4400-82-L-0076

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 82-012/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 82-012/03L-0 concerning the low Fuel Handling Ventilation exhaust flowrate on April 16, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.9.12 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,
J. J. Barton for

J. J. Barton
Acting Director, TMI-2

JJB/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director
B. J. Snyder, Program Director
V. Stello, Deputy Executive Director

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GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utilities System

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-II
LER 82-012/03L-0
EVENT DATE - APRIL 16, 1982

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1026 hours on April 16, 1982, the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) exhaust flowrate was discovered to be approximately 32,000 cfm, which is below the Technical Specification exhaust flowrate of > 36,000 cfm. A post-event review of the FHB exhaust flowrate recorder indicated that the low exhaust flowrate had existed from 0935 hours on April 16, 1982. During the time period in which the exhaust flowrate was below Technical Specification limits there were no radiological liquid or gas movements in the FHB. This event is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to inadvertent entry into the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.12.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Upon investigation, it was discovered that the FHB exhaust fan AH-E-10D had tripped. It is believed that the tripping of AH-E-10D resulted in the generation of a low exhaust flowrate signal and this, in turn, resulted in a trip of the FHB supply fans, AH-E-9A/9B. At no time during this event was an alarm received in the Control Room indicating an exhaust or supply fan trip.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss of ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The FHB ventilation fans were immediately restarted and the exhaust flowrate returned to within Technical Specification limits.

Long-Term

No apparent cause could be identified for the Fuel Handling Building exhaust fan (AH-E-10D) trip. An investigation of this event is underway to determine why the exhaust fan AH-E-10D tripped and why the operator was not alerted to the fan trip by the installed instrumentation and alarms.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A