Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Attn: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director  
Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406  

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
License Event Report 82-03/03L-0  

Attached please find License Event Report 82-03/03L-0 concerning the Nuclear Service River Water Pump (NR-P-1B) on January 11, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.7.4.1 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

J. J. Barton  
Acting Director, TMI-2

JJB:SDC:djb

Attachments

cc: L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director  
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office  
W. Stello, Deputy Executive Director  
Regional Operations and Generic Requirements  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555
At 1100 hours on January 11, 1982, Nuclear Services River Water (NSRW) pump NR-P-1B would not start when attempted during the performance of the weekly scheduled preventive maintenance. The problem was identified, repaired and the pump returned to service at 1343 hours on January 11, 1982. This event is considered reportable pursuant to Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the action statement of Tech. Spec. 3.7.4.1. This event had no effect on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the public.

The loose clip was repaired. Several other fuse clips were examined for similar problems. No other problems were identified.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FACILITY STATUS</th>
<th>% POWER</th>
<th>RECOVERY MODE</th>
<th>LOCATION OF RELEASE</th>
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<th>LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE</th>
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<tr>
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At 1100 hours on January 11, 1982, Nuclear Services River Water (NSRW) pump NR-P-1B would not start when attempted during the performance of the weekly scheduled preventive maintenance. The problem was identified, repaired and the pump returned to service at 1343 hours on January 11, 1982. This event is considered reportable pursuant to Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the action statement of Tech. Spec. 3.7.4.1. This event had no effect on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the public.

The loose clip was repaired. Several other fuse clips were examined for similar problems. No other problems were identified.
I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1100 hours on January 11, 1982, Nuclear Services River Water (NSRW) pump NR-P-1B would not start when attempted during the performance of the weekly scheduled preventive maintenance.

Tech Spec 3.7.4.1 requires two independent operable Nuclear Service River Water loops. Each loop has two pumps (NR-P-1 A/B and NR-P-1 C/D) one of which must be operable. At the time NR-P-1B failed to start, NR-P-1A was inoperable (Reference LER 81-11) resulting in having only one operable loop. Upon investigation, the problem was identified, repaired, and the loop was returned to service at 1343 hours on January 11, 1982.

This event is considered reportable pursuant to Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the Action Statement of Tech Spec 3.7.4.1.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The event was caused by a loose fuse clip in the control power switchgear for NR-P-1B located in Bus 2-3E, compartment 3E-4 in the river water screenhouse.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

The cause was identified and repaired as indicated above.

Several other breaker boxes (i.e., compartments) of Bus 2-3E have been investigated in order to determine if this event was caused by a generic problem. The investigation turned up no other problems.

LONG TERM

No additional action is considered appropriate at this time.
V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A