

B&W
DEC 16 1983
260

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK 188140 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | P | A | T | M | I | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 60 81 88 89 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On April 23, 1981, the "A" Nuclear Service River Water Pump was started for operation
03 | The pump exhibited high vibrations and high current readings. An evaluation showed
04 | that the pump should be declared inoperable to prevent further damage. The inoperable
05 | status resulted in a violation of Tech Spec 3.7.4.1 since the "B" pump had been
06 | declared inoperable in October, 1979. There was no effect on the health and safety
07 | of the public.

08 | _____

09 | SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP. SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE
W | A | E | F | P | U | M | P | X | X | B | Z
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LER NO. REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 1 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 1 | 1 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 1 | REPORT TYPE | X | REVISION NO. | 1
21 22 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
18 | ACTION TAKEN | X | 19 | FUTURE ACTION | B | 20 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 21 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 22 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | X | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | B | 5 | 8 | 0 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The cause of this event was most likely due to excessive clearance at the bottom of
11 | the pump which caused excessive vibration leading to damage. Procedures were re-
12 | written to ensure that backup pumps are powered to provide cooling water to operating
13 | diesels. The pumps have been overhauled.

14 | _____

15 | FACILITY STATUS | X | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | 30 | Recovery Mode | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | 32 | Operator observation - normal operation
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | 35 | N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE | 36 | N/A
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 46 80

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | 39 | N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | 41 | N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12

8311210363 831031
PDR ADOCK 05000320
S PDR

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | 43 | N/A
7 8 9 10

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | 45 | N/A
7 8 9 10

LER 81-011/01X-1
EVENT DATE - April 23, 1981

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

During normal operations, the "A" Nuclear Service River Water Pump (NR-P-1A) was started prior to running the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator. The pump exhibited high vibrations and high current readings. The pump was then tested, and the results of that test indicated that the pump should be declared inoperable in order to avoid further damage to the pump. Since NR-P-1B has been inoperable since October 1979, the removal of NR-P-1A from service constituted a violation of Tech Spec 3.7.4.1. Parts for repair of both pumps have been on order since the failure of NR-P-1B.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

During the disassembly of NR-P-1A, extensive wear was found on the lower bearings and the intermediate tube ends were flaired outwards. This was most likely caused by excessive clearances at the bottom of the pump which resulted in excessive vibration leading to the pump failure.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate - Continued the efforts to expedite the order for parts required for repairs. The Station Blackout Procedure, 2202-2.1, was revised to ensure Nuclear Service River Water Pumps "C" and "D" are powered from DF-X-1A if DF-X-1B failed to auto start when a blackout occurred. This ensures that cooling water is available to the operating diesel.

Long-Term - Since the date of this event, NR-P-1A and NR-P-1B have been overhauled. The last of these overhauls was completed in May, 1982.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Nuclear Service River Water Pumps

Manufactured by Byron Jackson

Model No.: 42RXL

Type: Vertical, Centrifugal, Mixed Flow



GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 480
Route 441 South
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191
717 944-7621
TELEX 84-2386
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

October 31, 1983
4410-83-L-0243

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Updated Licensee Event Reports

The Licensee Event Reports listed in Attachment 1 have been updated and are enclosed as Attachment 2 to this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. J. Byrne of my staff.

Sincerely,



B. K. Kanga
Director, TMI-2

BKK/JJB/RDW/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

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LIST OF UPDATED LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

- 80-27 Closing of Deluge Isolation Valves FS-V-4-22B, 4-23B, and 4-24B.
- 80-39 Halon bottles below weight.
- 81-11 Inoperability of Nuclear Service River Water Pump "A".
- 81-24 Excessive Reactor Coolant System leakage.
- 81-30 Improper administrative controls for containment penetration isolation valves.
- 81-37 Nuclear Service River Water Pump NR-P-1B inoperability.
- 82-01 Inoperability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.
- 82-23 Actuation of the AIT Halon System.
- 82-41 Inoperability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.
- 83-01 Inoperability of "A" OTSG pressure indicators.
- 83-04 Failure of the AIT Deluge System.
- 83-06 Leak Testing of the Reactor Building Personnel Airlock No. 2.
- 83-14 Actuation of the Air Intake Tunnel Halon System.