

Metropolitan Edison Company Post Office Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Writer's Direct Dial Number 13

December 8, 1980 TLL 646

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 1940

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 80-050/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-050/01L-0, concerning the failure of Incore Thermocouple H-9 on November 8, 1980.

This event is a violation of Section 3.3.3.6, Table 3.10, item 10, and is reportable under Section 6.9.1.9 of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

G. K. Hovey
Vice-President and
Director, TMI-2

GKH:SDC:dad

Attachments

cc: John T. Collins

8012150185

1002 S 1/1 NRC FORM 366. U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TLL 646 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Attachment 1 CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 PATMI 0 1 CON'T 2 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 9 | 68 | 69 | EVENT DATE | 74 | 75 | REPORT DATE | 80 | 9 SOURCE L 6 0 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) /Incore Thermocouple H-9 began to exhibit erratic behavior, /therefore, 0 2 with Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10, item 10, this report is submitted 0 3 LERs 80-13 and 80-41 concern thermocouple failure also. This event had no adverse 0 4 0 5 effects on the facility or the natural circulation heat removal from the core 0 6 0 7 SYSTEM CAUSE CALISE COMP VALVE SUBCODE CODE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE X 13 X X (11) E (12) S T R U (14) Z (16) 18 OCCURRENCE REVISION SEQUENTIAL REPORT LER RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. REPORT 8 0 0 | 5 | 0 | L 0 0 HOURS (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED SHUTDOWN METHOD NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 20 | Z](21) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N (24) N (25) B | 1 | CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The reason for the failure of Thermocouple H-9 is not known and may not be possible 1 0 to determine given the condition of the Unit 2 core relative to incore instrumentation We are evalua-No corrective actions are appropriate relative to thermocouple failure | ting the situation to determine of any trend is becoming apparent and whether such a 1 4 trend would have a safety impact in the long term 9 80 FACILITY STATUS METHOD OF OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) R (3) Operator Review of thermocouple ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED OF RELEASE 1 6 Z 33 Z 34 10 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER. TYPE 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 11 12 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80 DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 0 40 1 8 N/A 12 Loss of OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION

N/A

N/A

80

NRC USE ONLY

PHONE (717) 948-8461

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10 PUBLICITY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-2

LER 80-050/01L-0 EVENT DATE - November 08, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

Incore Thermocouple H-9 began to exhibit erratic behavior; therefore, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10, Item 10, this report is being submitted.

To date, three (3) LERs, including this one, concern thermocouple failures; the other two (2) are LER 80-13 and LER 80-41.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The precise reason for the failure/erratic behavior of Incore Thermocouple H-9 is not known and may not be possible to determine given the condition of the Unit 2 core relative to incore instrumentation.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term, cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the 'A' steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

No immediate action is applicable.

LONG TERM

We are evaluating the situtation to determine if any trend is becoming apparent and whether such a trend would have a safety impact in the long term.

V. = COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

The failed thermocouple was a Type K (Chromium/Alumel) thermocouple, Model No. DAZA-76-7R-1B-1T-1C, supplied by Babcock and Wilcox and manufactured by Bel Fab, Inc.