Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Licensee Event Report 80-048/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-048/03L-0, concerning the failure of Containment Isolation valve CF-V115, on October 17, 1980.

This event concerns Section 3.6.1.1 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

G. K. Posey  
Vice-President and  
Director, TMI-2

cc: John T. Collins  
    Bernard J. Snyder

Attachments
After sampling the "A" Core Flood Tank, the flow path was secured by closing the appli-
cable valves. However, one valve, CF-V115, the inner Containment Isolation Valve, failed
to close. It was determined that the valve failed open. This event was not a violation
of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 since the action statement is being complied with.
This report is submitted under section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Technical Specifications.
This event had no impact on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the
public.

The apparent cause for the valve inoperability is the grounding out of the motor and
control circuits. The grounding was probably induced by water leakage into the motor
operator due to the extended period of submersion. The outer containment isolation
valve has been closed and deactivated along with two downstream parallel diaphragm
operated valves being maintained closed. 

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT CODE</th>
<th>VALVE SUBCODE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>D1</td>
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<tr>
<th>SYSTEM CODE</th>
<th>CAUSE CODE</th>
<th>COMPONENT CODE</th>
<th>CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>A12</td>
<td>A14</td>
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<td>After sampling the &quot;A&quot; Core Flood Tank, the flow path was secured by closing the applicable valves. However, one valve, CF-V115, the inner Containment Isolation Valve, failed to close. It was determined that the valve failed open. This event was not a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 since the action statement is being complied with. This report is submitted under section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Technical Specifications. This event had no impact on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the public.</td>
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| USE ONLY | 801125547 |
I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

On Friday, October 17, 1980, the "A" Core Flood Tank was sampled. To accomplish the sampling valves CF-V2A, CF-V115, CF-V144, and CF-V106 were opened. At the completion of the sampling, the lineup was secured. No indication was received for the position of CF-V115, the inner Containment Isolation valve.

An investigation determined that CF-V115 was open and that the motor and control circuits were inoperable due to grounding.

This report is submitted because the Action Statement 3.6.1.1 was entered inadvertently. This is not a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 as the action statement is being complied with.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause for the valve inoperability is the grounding out of the motor and control circuits. The grounding was probably induced by water leakage into the motor operator due to the extended period of submersion.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term, cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator, which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event, there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

In compliance with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, the outer containment isolation valve is being maintained deactivated in the closed position. Two (2) parallel diaphragm operated valves downstream of the outer isolation valve are also being maintained closed.

No action relating to restoring Valve CF-V115 is possible in the near future.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Limiterque Motor operated valve actuator model SMB-000.