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Metropolitan Edison Company
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Writer's Direct Dial Number

TELEPHONE SERVICES
MARCH

November 17, 1980
TLL 606

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 80-047/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-047/03L-0, concerning the excessive seal leakage of the inner door of Personnel Airlock No. 2 on October 16, 1980.

This event concerns Section 3.6.1.3(a) and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

G. K. Hovey
Vice-President and
Director, TMI-2

GKH:SDC:dad

Attachments (2)

cc: John T. Collins
Bernard J. Snyder

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-2

LER 80-047/03L-0

EVENT DATE - October 10, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

On Thursday, October 16, 1980, the third Reactor Building entry was made using Personnel Airlock (PAL) No. 2 for entry and exiting the containment. After the Airlock was decontaminated, the airlock inner door was leak tested, per surveillance procedure 4311-5. The leakrate exceeded the Technical Specification limit; therefore, at 2205 hours, the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 was entered. The outer PAL door was then tested and determined acceptable.

On Friday, October 17, 1980, the airlock inner door was opened and the sealing surfaces cleaned. The door was then closed and the leakrate remeasured with satisfactory results. The door was returned to operable status at 1615 hours.

This event is not a violation of any Technical Specification, but this report is issued because Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered inadvertently.

This event is of a similar nature to LERs 80-10/01L-0, 80-30/01L-0, 80-37/01L-0, and 80-44/01L-0, pertaining to excessive seal leakage for both PAL's of the TMI-2 facility.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this event was apparently some foreign material on the sealing surfaces, which prevented an adequate seal.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term, cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" Steam Generator, which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event, there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

The sealing surfaces were cleaned and the leakrate test was then performed with satisfactory results.

LONG TERM

No long term action is planned nor considered applicable.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A