Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 80-046/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-046/01L-0, concerning the de-energizing of busses 2-38 and 2-48 on September 30, 1980.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.8.2.1 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

G. K. Hovey
Vice-President and Director, TMI-2

Attachments

cc: John T. Collins
    Bernard J. Snyder
On Sept. 30, 1980 at 1030 hours, the feeder breakers for busses 2-38 and 2-48 were removed from service for maintenance. Through the shift foreman's error, the time clock was not initiated for removal of the Teel (T.S. required) busses. Consequently, the outdoor condition exceeded the applicable Action period before the situation was corrected. This was a violation of Tech. Spec. 3.8.1.2 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b). This event had no effect on the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the public.

The event resulted from the Shift Foreman not checking the Tech. Spec. as appropriate.

And consequently, not initiating the time clock. Once identified, the bus feeder breakers were replaced and the busses restored to an operable status. To bolster the foreman's knowledge, in the training cycle starting October 8, 1980, the Operator Recertification Program will include a class in which all T.S. required equipment is identified.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-2
LER 00-046/01L-0
EVENT DATE - September 30, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

To perform maintenance on the breakers for busses 2-38 and 2-48, maintenance requested permission from the Shift Foreman to deenergize and remove these breakers. The Shift Foreman verified that no equipment was supplied from these busses, then gave his permission to deenergize and remove the breakers at 1030 on September 30, 1980. The Shift Foreman failed to realize at this time that these busses were required to be energized per Technical Specification 3.8.2.

On October 1, 1980, while performing a Tech. Spec. Surveillance, it was discovered that busses 2-38 and 2-48 were deenergized, contrary to the Tech. Spec. requirements. The busses had been deenergized greater than the 8 hours specified in the action statement to Technical Specification 3.8.2; therefore, this is a violation and is reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b).

The busses were returned to service at 2000 hours on October 1, 1980.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this event was the Shift Foreman not realizing these busses were required by Technical Specifications, even though no equipment is presently powered from them.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

The busses were returned to service as soon as possible after it was determined they were required to be energized.

LONG TERM

During the training cycle starting October 8, 1980, the operator requal program will include a class on the Recovery Mode Technical Specifications. One of the emphasis of this class will be to identify all the Tech. Spec. required equipment.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A