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Writer's Direct Dial Number

October 29, 1980
TLL 561

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406


Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No: 50-320
Licensee Event Report 80-045/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-045/03L-0, concerning the failure to start of Emergency Diesel Generator DF-X-1B, on September 29, 1980.


This event concerns Section 3.8.1.1(a) and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b) of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely


G. J. Hovey
Vice-President and
Director, TMI-2

GKH:SDC:dad

Attachments

cc: John T. Collins


8011040349

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Acc 2
5/11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | P | A | T | M | I | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 58

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While performing ~~Surveillance Procedure~~ ^{TESTING,} 4303-M16B on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) ✓
0 3 | DF-X-1B, the diesel failed to start. Investigation revealed the load limit control was
0 4 | set at minimum instead of the procedurally required maximum setting, thus inhibiting
0 5 | startup. The control was reset and the surveillance completed satisfactorily within the
0 6 | action period of T.S. 3.8.1.1(a). This event was not a violation of Tech.Specs. but is
0 7 | considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b). This event had no effect on the plant,
0 8 | its operation, or the health and safety of the public. 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | E | E | 11 | CAUSE CODE | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | B | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | E | N | G | I | N | E | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | Z | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 0 | 21 | EVENT YEAR | 8 | 0 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 4 | 5 | 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32
18 | ACTION TAKEN | E | 33 | FUTURE ACTION | H | 34 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 35 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 36 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 41 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 42 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A | 43 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | F | 0 | 1 | 0 | 47 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The failure to start was the result of an operator mistaking a control for an indicator ✓
1 1 | and adjusting that control to the position stated in the procedure. Corrective actions
1 2 | included resetting the control, instructing all operators on EDG controls and indica-
1 3 | tors and modifying two procedures to remove ambiguity which aided in the error and to
1 4 | provide a check of load limit control position. 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | X | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | Recovery Mode | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator Observation | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 41
7 8 9 11 12 80

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 43
7 8 9 11 12 80

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 45 | NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 80

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-2

LER 80-045/03L-0

EVENT DATE - September 29, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

While performing Tech. Spec. Surveillance 4303-M16B, Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test on DF-X-1B, the diesel failed to start at 0425 hours on September 29, 1980.

During the investigation of the problem, the load limit control was found in the minimum position instead of the required maximum position. The load limit control functions by limiting the fuel supplied to the cylinders. With the load limit control in the minimum position insufficient fuel reached the cylinders to enable startup.

This event is not a violation of any Technical Specification; this report is issued because Action Statement 3.8.1.1(a) was entered inadvertently.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The licensee considers the cause of this event to be predominately due to personnel error and only secondarily to an ambiguity in procedure 2104-6.2, "Emergency Diesels and Auxiliaries". Instead of checking whether the governor position indicator was in the required minimum setting, the operator mistakingly checked the load limit control, which showed a maximum setting, and hence reset it to the minimum setting. The procedure step calling out the governor position indication check referred to a governor "knob", implying that it could be operator adjusted. However, the governor position indicator cannot be adjusted in such a manner. Apparently, the operator mistook the adjustable load limit control as the governor "knob" and, therefore, adjusted it as directed by the procedure. In any event, the operator should have realized the intent of the procedure step.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 Facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

The immediate action was to reset the Load Limit controller to the maximum fuel position. The diesel was then successfully started and run as required by 4301-M16B at 0548 hours on September 29, 1980.

Subsequent actions included:

1. The controls and indications addressed in this report were labeled to allow easier identification. In addition, the controls were labeled "Do Not Adjust w/o S/F permission".

2. All operators, including the operator that confused the controls/ indications initially, were instructed on the location and proper use of controls and indications associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators.
3. Step 4.6.5.8 of OP 2104-6.2 was modified to ensure clarity as to which indication is to be checked.
4. Finally, Step 4.2.19 was added to OP 2104-6.2 to ensure the Load Limit control is in maximum fuel position when performing Emergency Standby Lineup, this is the last step performed when placing the Diesel Generator into Emergency Standby after it has been shutdown.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A