Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)  
Operating License No. DPR-73  
Docket No. 50-320  
Licensee Event Report 80-030/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-030/01L-0, concerning the Personnel Air Lock inner door seal leakage on July 17, 1980.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.6.1.3.a and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.8.b of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

G. K. Hovey
Director, TMI-2

GKH:SDC:dad
Attachments

cc: John T. Collins
    Bernard J. Snyder

8009020378
During Recovery Mode of Operation (cold shutdown, decay heat removal) the inner Personnel Airlock (PAL) door was opened for the first Reactor Building Entry since the March 1979 accident. During the entry, the seals were cleaned of loose matter and seal lubricant was applied. The door was closed after completion of the entry. Surveillance testing showed seal leakage was in excess of surveillance requirement. 4.6.1.3.a. This event had no effect on the plant, its operation or the health and safety of the public.

Apparently, some foreign material still remained on the seal, preventing an adequate seal. In that there was no gross leakage, the personnel in the airlock could do nothing to stop the leakage, and since the outer PAL door sealed correctly, coupled with ALARA considerations, opening the door to reclean the seals was postponed to the scheduled entry on 7/23/80. The 7/23 recleaning and leak testing were successful.

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NAME OF PREPARER: Steven D. Chaplin

PHONE: (717) 948-8461
EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

On July 16, 1980, the Reactor Building personnel airlock inner door was opened for the first time since the March 23, 1979, accident to obtain general area radiation levels inside of the Reactor Building. The inner door seal was cleaned to remove any loose matter on the seal gasket and sealing lubricant was then applied. The door was closed when the surveys were completed. Surveillance testing of the inner door was performed and the leakage rate exceeded the limits of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.a. Since there was no gross leakage and the personnel inside the airlock could do nothing else to stop the leak they exited the airlock. Testing of the outer personnel airlock door was then completed satisfactorily.

At 1600 hours on July 17, 1980, the action period expired and the violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3.a became prompt reportable.

CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

This was the first time since the accident that the personnel airlock inner door had been opened. When the door was shut, apparently some foreign material was on the sealing surface preventing adequate sealing.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event, there was no Loss of Natural Circulation Heat Removal in the RCS system.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

No immediate action was appropriate under the circumstances. Due to the limited scope of the entry into the airlock and the test opening of the inner door no repair work could be performed at that time.

LONG TERM

On July 23, 1980, the inner door was again opened during a Reactor Building Entry. A technician remained in the airlock and cleaned the sealing surface with solvent. Surveillance testing was then completed satisfactorily on both the inner and outer personnel airlock door.

COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A