October 31, 1983
4410-83-L-0243

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
   Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
   Docket No. 50-320
Updated Licensee Event Reports

The Licensee Event Reports listed in Attachment 1 have been
updated and are enclosed as Attachment 2 to this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. J. Byrne of
my staff.

Sincerely,

B. K. Kung
Director, TMI-2

BKK/JJB/RDW/jep

Attachments

CC: Mr. L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director - TMI Program Office
   Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director - TMI Program Office

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
In preparation for execution of the Reactor Building Purge, the Modified Hydrogen Purge Filters and the Reactor Building Purge Exhaust Filter fire protection deluge valves were closed. This was to ensure that an automatic actuation of the fire protection deluge would not have an adverse affect on the HEPA filter performance and therefore on the purge. The thermal and combustion products detectors remained operational. This event had no effect on the plant, its operations, or the health and safety of the public.

At 1410 hours on July 9, 1980, the 14-day action period of the deluge/sprinkler system Tech Spec 3.7.10.2 expired making this event prompt reportable. Tech Spec Change Request No. 26 submitted on February 23, 1981, and approved on April 9, 1982, revised Tech Spec 3.7.10.2 to allow single isolation of the deluge valves for the above filters.
LER 80-027/01X-1
EVENT DATE - July 9, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF THE OCCURRENCE

In preparation for execution of the Reactor Building purge, deluge isolation valves FS-V-4223, 423B, and 424B were closed in accordance with a Temporary Change Notice (TCN) to Procedure No. OP-2104-6.1. They were closed to preclude inadvertent operation during the conduct of the purge and subsequent degradation of the HEPA filters.

The thermal and combustion products detectors in the filter assemblies remained operable which would give an alarm in the Control Room if fire was present. The Deluge System was still operable if manually actuated by opening the applicable valve.

At 1410 hours on July 9, 1980, the 14-day Tech Spec action period requiring these valves be opened, was exceeded, and, therefore, the item became prompt reportable per Tech Spec 6.9.1.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

See Section I. above.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator which is operating in a "steaming" mode. Throughout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation Heat Removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Long-Term - The charcoal has been removed from the Reactor Building Exhaust Filters and the Hydrogen Purge Exhaust Filter and therefore these filters no longer present a fire hazard. Tech Spec Change Request No. 26, submitted on February 23, 1981, and approved on April 9, 1982, revised Tech Spec 3.7.10.2 to indicate that the fire suppression supply line to these filters may be isolated by a single, manually operated valve. This places the Deluge System for these filters in a manual mode instead of an automatic mode of operation, thereby preventing a spurious signal from needlessly activating the Deluge System. The fire detectors associated with the Deluge Systems are not effected and are still available to provide an alarm in the event a fire should start in the area of these filters.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80-27</td>
<td>Closing of Deluge Isolation Valves FS-V-4-22B, 4-23B, and 4-24B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-39</td>
<td>Halon bottles below weight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-11</td>
<td>Inoperability of Nuclear Service River Water Pump &quot;A&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-24</td>
<td>Excessive Reactor Coolant System leakage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-30</td>
<td>Improper administrative controls for containment penetration isolation valves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-37</td>
<td>Nuclear Service River Water Pump NR-P-1B inoperability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-01</td>
<td>Inoperability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-23</td>
<td>Actuation of the AIT Halon System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-41</td>
<td>Inoperability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-01</td>
<td>Inoperability of &quot;A&quot; OTSG pressure indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-04</td>
<td>Failure of the AIT Deluge System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-06</td>
<td>Leak Testing of the Reactor Building Personnel Airlock No. 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-14</td>
<td>Actuation of the Air Intake Tunnel Halon System.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>