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Writer's Direct Dial Number

July 18, 1980
TLL 358

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit II (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 80-026/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-026/03L-0 concerning the condition of having less than the minimum required number of firepumps Operable on June 18, 1980.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.7.10.1 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9.b of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

/s/ G. K. Hovey

G. K. Hovey
Director, TMI-II

GKH:SDC:dad

cc: J. T. Collins


Attachments (2)

A002
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1/1

8007290 8/1

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 PATMI 2 00-000000-000 411111 5

CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 05000320 7 061880 8 071880 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During Recovery Mode of Operation (cold shutdown, decay heat removal) the Unit 2
03 Fire Pump (FS-P-1) was removed from service on June 18, 1980. June 19 it was real-
04 ized that Unit 1 Fire Pump (FS-P-1) was not aligned to the fire suppression header.
05 This resulted in having only 2 fire pumps aligned to the header in violation of
06 Tech. Spec. 3.7.10.1 which requires 3 of 4. The event is considered reportable un-
07 der Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.9.b. The event had no effect on the plant, its operation,
08 or the health and safety of the public.

09 SYSTEM CODE A B 11 CAUSE CODE X 12 CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13 COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
17 LER/RD REPORT NUMBER 80 EVENT YEAR 80 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 026 OCCURRENCE CODE 03 REPORT TYPE L REVISION NO. 0
18 X 19 G 20 Z 21 Z 22 0000 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPPD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Before removing Unit 2 FS-P-1 from service, the Unit 2 control room assured opera-
11 bility of the 3 Unit 1 fire pumps but did not explicitly inquire as to their align-
12 ment to the fire suppression's header. This resulted in not having Unit 1 FS-P-1
13 aligned to the header when needed. Unit 1 FS-P-1 was aligned to the header. Sub-
14 sequently, procedures are being revised to reflect a permanent valve lineup change.

15 FACILITY STATUS X 28 % POWER 000 29 OTHER STATUS Recovery Mode 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY C 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation 32

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED Z 44 DESCRIPTION N/A 45

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-II

LER 80-026/03L-0
EVENT DATE - June 18, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

The Unit II River Water Intake Diesel Fire Pump (FS-P-1) was removed from service at 1030 hours on June 18, 1980, for the safety of divers that were cleaning sludge from the Unit II screen house intake. At 1630 hours on June 19, 1980, it was discovered that a Unit II valve (FS-V5) was closed, isolating the Unit I Circulating Water Flume Diesel Fire Pump (Unit I, FS-P-1) from the fire suppression header. FS-V5 is a bypass valve around a checkvalve which dedicates the Unit I pump FS-P-1 to the Unit I cooling towers portion of the fire protection system. This resulted in having only two (2) of the three (3) remaining Operable pumps aligned to the header. This was a violation of Technical Specifications 3.7.10.1.a which requires that three (3) fire pumps be Operable and aligned to the header.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Before removing FS-P-1 from service, the Unit II control room did not adequately communicate with the Unit I control room as to both the Operability and alignment to the fire suppression header of the three (3) Unit I fire pumps. Inquiry was made about the three (3) pumps Operability but not specifically their alignment.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit II facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the A steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

Valve FS-V5 was opened to align the Unit I pump (FS-P-1) with the fire suppression header.

LONG TERM

The valve (FS-V5) position has been changed from a normally closed to a normally open position to eliminate the necessity of cycling the valve every time a fire pump is removed and returned to service. Applicable Unit I and Unit II procedures are being revised to reflect this change. NOTE: This change does not affect Unit to Unit notifications of changes in fire pump Operability.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A