June 17, 1980
TLL 289

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: B. H. Grier, Director
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit II (TMI-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report 80-019/03L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-019/03L-0 concerning the loss of the "B" Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level instrumentation.

This event constitutes a violation of Section 3.3.3.6 and is reportable under Section 6.9.1.8 of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

/s/ G. K. Hovey

G. K. Hovey
Director, TMI-2

Attachments

cc: J. T. Collins
### Licensee Event Report

**Event Description and Probable Consequences**
During recovery mode operation (decay heat removal via OTSG 'A' - cold shutdown core) on May 18, 1980 at 0336 hours, the B Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level instrumentation became inoperable. The B OTSG was being maintained in a standby status, therefore, there was no immediate need to have accurate level indication.

Other parameters were monitored to indirectly assure that the level remained on station until the level instrument could be returned to service. This event had no effect on the plant, its operation or the health and safety of the public.

**The cause was**

The behavior of the level indication appeared to be the result of some sensing line becoming plugged at the root valve. It is suspected that dirt or some other material blocked the root valve during N₂ pressurization of the B OTSG (in preparation for sampling the B OTSG). The sensing line was successfully backflushed with nitrogen under pressure to remove the restriction. The transmitter was returned to service 5/23.

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**Event Description and Probable Consequences**

### Event Details

- **Event Date**: May 18, 1980
- **Event Time**: 0336 hours
- **Location**: B OTSG
- **Operator**: Steven D. Chaplin
- **Phone**: (717) 948-8553

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**Event Summary**

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-II
LER 80-019/01L-0
EVENT DATE-May 18, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

The B Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) level instrumentation became inoperable at 0330 hours on 5/18/80. The behavior of the level indication appeared to be the result of one sensing leg becoming plugged at the root valve. The level instrument consists of a GP transmitter temporarily connected across the OTSG at points external to the reactor building.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The reason for the suspected blockage at the root valve is not clear. It is suspected that dirt or some other material blocked the root valve seat during N₂ pressurization of the B OTSG in preparation for sampling.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit II facility was in a long term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay circulation to the steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughtout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS system.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

The B OTSG was being maintained in standby, therefore, there was no immediate need to have accurate level indication. Other parameters were monitored to indirectly assure that the level remained constant until the level instrument could be returned to service.

The sensing line was successfully backflushed with nitrogen under pressure in order to remove the restriction. The transmitter was returned to service on May 25, 1980.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

NA