Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: B. H. Grier, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit II (TMI-2)
Operating Licence No. DPR-73
Docket No. 50-320
Licensee Event Report No. 80-010/01L-0

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 80-010/01L-0 concerning the Personnel Air Lock seal leakage on March 14, 1980.

This event was a violation of Interim Recovery Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 and is considered reportable under section 6.9.1.8.b of the same specification.

Sincerely,

G. K. Hovey
Director, TMI-II

cc: B. Snyder
J. T. Collins
Following the first Personnel Air Lock Entry (PAL) using the outside PAL door, the door seals were tested, per Technical Specification 4.6.1.3. The leakage exceeded the rate criteria, therefore, the PAL was declared inoperable.

The apparent cause of the seal leakage was the use of the personnel door following almost a year of not using the door. The seal was replaced and the door adjusted. The seal was retested successfully.
I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

Following the first Personnel Air Lock entry using the outside Personnel Air Lock (PAL) door seals were tested pursuant to Recovery Technical Specification 4.6.1.3.a. The test showed the seal leakage exceeded the leak rate criteria of 2577 cc/min at 12:30 3/13/80 whereupon the personnel air lock was declared inoperable and the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 was entered.

The outside PAL door seals were replaced and retested with unsatisfactory results at approximately 6:00 pm 3/13/80. Door shimming and adjustments program was initiated and finally at 1:15 pm 3/14/80 an acceptable leak rate was achieved. However, the 24 hour action period was exceeded, thus this event became reportable as a prompt report under Technical Specification 4.9.1.8.b.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of the seal leakage was the use of the personnel door following almost a year of not using the door nor maintaining the door seals following the March 28th accident. Subsequent adjustment and leak rate testing took slightly longer to accomplish than the 24 action period permitted by specification 3.6.1.3.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit II facility was in a long term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the A steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation in the RCS system.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

The personnel door seals were replaced and tested. No further action is planned or warranted.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A