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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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IE Bulletin No. 79-06A
(Revision No. 1)

REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE
THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT

IE Bulletin 79-06A identified actions to be taken by the licensees of all
pressurized water reactors designed by Westinghouse.

Item No. 3 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin,
was:

"3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident
with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety
injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low
pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the
pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection
would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. In
addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection
when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation
setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the
actuation setpoint."

Information from licensees and Westinghouse has identified that
implementation of this action would preclude the performance of surveillance
testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables without initiating a safety
injection.

In order to permit surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure
bistables, the low pressurizer level bistables that must operate in
coincidence with the low pressurizer pressure bistables may be restored to
normal operation for the duration of the surveillance test of that
coincident pressurizer pressure channel. At the conclusion of the
surveillance test of each pressurizer pressure channel, the coincident
pressurizer level channel must be returned to the tripped mode defined in
Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin 79-06A.

As a result, Item 3 should be revised as follows:

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"3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident
with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety

injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. The pressurizer level bistables may be returned to their normal operating positions during the pressurizer pressure channel functional surveillance tests. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint."

Item 13 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:

"13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items."

Long term resolutions of some of these required actions may require design changes. Therefore, Item 13 of actions to be taken should be revised as follows:

"13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items and identify design changes necessary in order to effect long term resolutions of these items."

For all light water reactor facilities designed by Westinghouse with an operating license, respond to Items 1-12 within 10 days of the receipt of this Bulletin. Respond to Item 13 (Technical Specification Change proposals and identification of design changes in 30 days.)

The other requirements of IE Bulletin 79-06A remain in effect.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.